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Abstract
The Haitian Threat
Humanitarianism, Security, and Internally Displaced Haitians Following the 2010
Earthquake
Kelsy Yeargain
The American University in Cairo
under the supervision of Dr Agnes Czjaka
This thesis explores the relationships between internally displaced Haitians,
humanitarian organizations, and the international community. The thesis focuses
primarily on humanitarianism as a mechanism of security and the framing of displaced
Haitians as security threats. I engaged with the discourses of the media and humanitarian
organizations, as well as interviews conducted with aid workers in Haiti following the
earthquake. Exploring the dynamic relationships of humanitarian organizations, the
international community, the Haitian government and the internally displaced Haitians,
this thesis attempts to problematize the many assumptions about international
humanitarian aid and the Haitian population. There are three major focuses of the thesis:
the increasing use of security in the distribution of humanitarian aid, humanitarianism
operating as a mechanism of security and the construction of meaning and threat.
By complicating humanitarian assistance as not just an act of goodwill towards
mankind and by arguing that the failures of delivering humanitarian aid post-earthquake
were not the result of inefficiencies, violent Haitians or a corrupt “failed state.” They are
instead the result of humanitarianism functioning as a mechanism of governance, the
prioritization of security in the distribution of aid, and how Haitians and the Haitian state
are discursively represented as both hopeless and caught in a vicious cycle of poverty and
violence, and as potential security threats to themselves, to Haitian women and to aid
workers. This thesis discusses the very foundation of humanitarianism itself and the
relationship between humanitarianism as an industry, the international system, security,
representational practices and the construction of threats and ask how these multiple
issues intersect to create the kind of humanitarianism that we see in post-earthquake
Haiti.
This thesis explores how the dominant narratives about humanitarianism and
Haitians are a reflection of the unequal power distribution of the international community
and how those narratives construct to portray Haitians and internally displaced
populations in a particular way to help justify political interventions, which in turn
recreate and reconstruct the meanings and identities of the population. Deconstructing
dominant narratives about humanitarianism allows for a more nuanced exploration of
what exactly humanitarianism is and how it functions as a mechanism of power,
governance and security.
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Introduction
“Until Jan. 12, Haiti was a “fragile state” desperate for help to develop a working economy and
effective institutions. Now it is something much worse — a charnel house with tens of thousands
of corpses in a capital city laid waste” (Traub 2010).
“Twenty years in inner-city ERs, I thought I had seen it all until ... Haiti. Flying in you feel like you are
being dropped into a war zone — helicopters, tents, military vehicles, cargo boxes and searchlights”
(Plantz 2010).

The United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) headquarters in Haiti
are located near the airport in Port Au Prince. The security is tight; men in blue helmets
patrol the area in armored tanks. The complex is surrounded by walls and fences topped
with barbed wire, and the gates are manned by tanks and men with rifles. Each day lines
of Haitians wait outside in the blistering sun for the opportunity to enter the complex.
After the earthquake, MINUSTAH became one of the primary headquarters for most of
the United Nations (UN) organizations and most of the interagency cluster meetings were
held in this complex. The majority of Haitians waiting outside were camp managers,
local NGO workers, or members of camp committees who were asking for meetings with
one of the agencies located inside. In order to enter the complex, Haitians needed a letter
of approval and their names had to be on a list. They had to produce identification cards
and have their bags searched and their bodies patted down after walking through a metal
detector. It is a site of security. This is not unusual in Haiti. In fact, the scene repeats
itself at most entrances to the humanitarian organization complexes. What is interesting
about this story is not just the securitization itself, but the ways in which security
manifests itself in Haiti. When I wanted to enter the complex, I was ushered to the front
of the line. The security officers asked to see my American passport, and I was escorted
around the metal detector and into the complex. Although I had approval, and my name
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was on “the list” the security officers never checked for my name. A young, blonde,
American passport-holding woman is apparently not a security threat.
This story reveals two of the major themes in this thesis. The first is the increasing
use of security mechanisms in the distribution and functions of humanitarian aid. The
second is the construction of identities, meanings and, ultimately, threats. I will discuss
how this and multiple other factors are influencing how humanitarian organizations
operate in Haiti. The thesis reveals how international organizations have increasing
control over the everyday lives of internally displaced Haitians, and how security
measures dictate access to goods and services. The thesis also reveals a certain duality
inherent in the security: Security is experienced differently based on the population and
the individual. Enmeshing humanitarianism and traditional security mechanisms makes
humanitarianism a mechanism of security.
When I began this research project I wanted to answer a seemingly simple question:
Why was the United States military deployed to distribute aid in Haiti? I knew the answer
would be much more complicated than the dominant narratives. I knew the answer was
grounded in the increasing securitization of societies, the construction of Haitians as
security threats, and the role of the international community in how aid is distributed. I
also thought that the answer could be easily sketched, that I could draw on sociohistorical and economic factors to illuminate the answers. However, after spending time
in Haiti, conducting interviews with aid workers from international aid organizations
such as World Vision, the American Red Cross, the International Committee of Red
Cross Red Crescent societies (ICRC), the International Organization for Migration
(IOM), the World Food Program (WFP), Samaritans Purse, MINUSTAH, the United
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States Agency for International Development (USAID), and the United States military, as
well as speaking to Haitian non-profit workers, and internally displaced Haitians1, I
realized I was ultimately asking the wrong question and attempting to answer it in the
wrong way. The deployment of US troops to Haiti was just one small part of a much
larger puzzle. By utilizing discourse analysis of the media and academic articles about
Haiti and the policies and programs of international humanitarian organizations, I
recognized the multiple layers and relationships that lie behind how humanitarian
agencies responded to the 2010 earthquake in Haiti and reveal the complicated
relationships between security, risks, humanitarianism, and the international community.
Throughout this thesis I will use

“international community” to signify the sets of

relationships between nation-states and international organizations. The term
international community does not imply that all actors within the global political arena
“behave” the same, but does refer to the often hegemonic control of the production of
knowledge, discourses and practices of particular actors within global politics.
Michel-Rolph Trouillot in Silencing the Past: Power and the Production of History
(1995) writes about which narratives matter, which stories are retold and which remain
silent. Haiti, since its beginning as a colony, has had only some of its stories retold, some
of its histories recounted. Who tells the stories about Haiti? Who has a voice about the
realities of Haitian life, both pre- and post-earthquake? When international humanitarian
organizations decide on policies and programs in Haiti, whose stories are heard, and
recounted, and determine how humanitarianism is practiced? The narratives about Haiti,
especially in the international community at large are discursively created and recreated
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All of the interviewees asked to remain anonymous. In some cases they allowed me to note the
organization they worked for.

3

by non-Haitians, by aid workers, missionaries, academics and politicians. The identities
and meanings about Haiti are created and constructed and then reproduced by outside
forces.
The cluster meetings I attended in the MINUSTAH headquarters were held almost
entirely in English or French (instead of Haitian Creole). The majority of the people
attending were not Haitian. At the meetings, the representatives spoke of the “parallel
structures” that operate in Haiti. Parallel structures were defined as the three pillars of
humanitarian assistance: The United Nations, the Haitian government and the NGO
community. The word parallel implies exactly what was occurring: parallel lines (even if
they are “pillars”) do not intersect. Each operates separately, with different goals and
different strategies. Although there were constant debates on the role of the Haitian
government in the distribution of aid and the rebuilding of Haiti, a consensus was never
reached.
The cluster meetings illuminate, first, that the humanitarian industry is a
mechanism of governance operating outside of Haitian law and governance. The imagery
of parallel structures reveals a common narrative of humanitarianism: It posits things as
being individual, unrelated, and distinct. Discussions about humanitarianism are often
framed in either/or terms: You are either a proponent of human rights or a defender of
state sovereignty; humanitarian organizations are either neutral and apolitical, or they are
the direct result of hegemonic policies by the United States and other Western powers.
The discourse on Haiti was similarly structured: Haiti will either have security, through
means of surveillance, policing and monitoring, or Haiti will descend into chaos; there
are Haitians who are vulnerable and Haitians who are not; there are Haitians who deserve
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aid, because of their vulnerability and there are Haitians who do not because of their
violence and corruption. Each supposedly exists separately and one must ultimately
choose a side.
Discussions about humanitarianism also highlight the seemingly natural conflicts
that complicate humanitarian aid distribution. In the case of the cluster meetings the
parallel structures analogy suggests the inability of the Haitian state (because of its
failure, its lack of good governance, its corruption) to work with the UN and the NGOs.
Haitian men are framed as being in conflict with Haitian women, aid workers and
themselves. Development cannot be achieved without security. There is the “first world,”
which has the knowledge and the ability (and the money and the power) to provide
humanitarian assistance in the “third world,” a place that stands in stark contrast to the
first world, a place that needs, requires, desires first world assistance. The first world has
a humanitarian duty to intervene, not just to end human suffering but also to ensure that
nothing spills over into neighboring countries.
In addition to questioning the relationships between humanitarian organizations,
states and the Haitian population, this thesis will attempt to problematize many of the
assumptions behind humanitarian assistance. I hope to suggest that the issues posed as
either/or are not so simple. They intersect and overlap. The human rights regime is not
necessarily in conflict state sovereignty. Haitian men are not always rioting, looting and
raping. The Haitian state cannot be contrasted so starkly with other nation states, because
of its “bad governance” and state failure. In the following chapters, I will attempt to
complicate humanitarian assistance as not just an act of goodwill towards man-kind and
argue that the failures of delivering humanitarian aid post-earthquake were not the result
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of inefficiencies, violent Haitians or a corrupt “failed state.” They are instead the result of
humanitarianism functioning as a mechanism of governance, the prioritization of security
in the distribution of aid, and how Haitians and the Haitian state are discursively
represented as both hopeless and caught in a vicious cycle of poverty and violence, and as
potential security threats to themselves, to Haitian women and to aid workers.
Delivering humanitarian assistance, rebuilding an already impoverished country
that has been destroyed by an earthquake and coordinating with multiple organizations
and governments with different objectives and policies is difficult. As you walk through
the streets of Haiti with piles of rubble and destroyed buildings all around, it can
sometimes feel not just difficult but impossible. This thesis, however, is not about the
operational barriers that humanitarian organizations and the Haitian government and
people face. It is not about how there needs to be more coordination between
organizations and the government or how to more efficiently distribute aid. I will discuss
the very foundation of humanitarianism itself and the relationship between
humanitarianism as an industry, the international system, security, representational
practices and the construction of threats and ask how these multiple issues intersect to
create the kind of humanitarianism that we see in post-earthquake Haiti.
In the following chapters I will explore the complexities of the relationships
embedded in international humanitarian assistance. In the first chapter, I will discuss how
humanitarianism is now the primary language and means of addressing global
inequalities, poverty and violence. Humanitarianism also manifests itself in political
interventions- when a state is deemed unable to adequately respond to the needs of its
population, humanitarian organizations are expected to respond instead. How the
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humanitarian organizations respond depends on the perceived causes of the inequalities
or violence, the mandates of the organizations and the political goals of the organizations
and their funders. As those perceived causes become increasingly framed as matters of
“insecurity,” humanitarianism itself is reflecting a move towards securitization, which I
will discuss in the second chapter. This is revealed on a variety of levels, from the
deployment of military troops, to armored vehicles for aid workers, to how aid is
distributed and how internally displaced population (IDP) camps are run. The focus on
security as the primary goal of humanitarianism is justified by the construction of
particular meanings and identities about the population receiving aid, in particular the
constructing of the populations as a threat in need of being secured against.
Power dynamics are inherent in each of these sets of relationships and factors. The
ability to decide who is able to give aid, and who deserves to receive it reflects the
political landscape and the dominant discourses about poverty deployed by the
international community. The language of humanitarianism is broadening to include
military operations, embargoes, and even private business investment (as in the case of
microcredit loans). The mandate of the United Nations as expressed in their charter is
to maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective
collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for
the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring
about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and
international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations
which might lead to a breach of the peace (Charter of the United Nations, Chapter I
1945).
The United Nations was created to ensure peace and security, but how exactly the
organization is expected to do so has changed in many ways since its formation in 1945.
The third chapter will explore how impoverished individuals, particularly young,

7

black men are considered a security threat. Haitians, with their “violent history” and
extreme poverty, represent the epitome of a risky population. Moreover, Haiti, as a failed
state, is considered a threat to the international system of nation-states. Military
intervention in the name of humanitarianism is viewed as a viable and efficient means of
ensuring human security. However, security is not necessarily about saving lives, but also
about the management and maintenance of a population. Security is about maintaining a
level of control over the population and ensuring continuity.
I will draw on Foucault’s (2008) notion of biopolitics and Agamben’s (1995)
interpretation of homo sacer, or bare life. Biopolitics and the bare life are frequently
discussed in articles critical of humanitarian practices and securitization. Haitians are
discursively represented as being at the extremity of human suffering, as being able to be
killed but not sacrificed (Agamben 1995). But the focus of this thesis is not on how
Haitians are homo sacer, or even how humanitarianism is a representation of Foucault’s
biopower, as some, like Fassin, have argued. According to Fassin,
Humanitarian intervention is a biopolitics insofar as it sets up and manages refugee
camps, establishes protected corridors in order to gain access to war casualties,
develops statistical tools to measure malnutrition, and makes use of communication
media to bear witness to injustice in the world (Fassin 2007: 501)
The focus of the thesis, however, are the dualities and ambiguities that exist in
discussions and understandings of humanitarianism. Understanding humanitarianism
requires picking apart the seemingly disparate parts and contingencies, rather than relying
on simple cause and effect. For example we cannot simply say the earthquake was one of
the worst tragedies to happen in the 21st century because Haiti was poor or because Haiti
is a failed state. We also should not suggest that it was difficult to distribute aid and
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humanitarian organizations needed security mechanisms because Haitian males are
violent and dangerous. Instead, I hope to explore how the multi-layered relationships and
realities that exist between humanitarian organizations, the international system, the
construction of threats, and the securitization of societies create a more complicated
question, one that demands we ask more questions: Why is Haiti so poor? Why are
Haitians males discursively represented as violent and dangerous? Why is Haiti a failed
state? What, exactly, is a failed state? This thesis is a critical, political and theoretical
engagement with humanitarianism and intervention and the processes and relationships of
humanitarian aid.

9

Chapter One: Humanitarianism, Intervention, and Haiti
Understanding the international response to the 2010 earthquake in Haiti first requires an
analysis of humanitarian intervention both broadly and within the particular case of Haiti.
This chapter will construct a framework through which to critically engage with the
humanitarian response in Haiti by situating it within the theory and practice of
humanitarianism and the history of intervention in Haiti. By conceptualizing
humanitarianism as a form of political intervention, and placing it within an historical
context the chapter will reveal how humanitarianism adapted to the relationships between
states, international organizations and displaced populations. The chapter will present the
history of humanitarianism in three parts: first, the origins of humanitarianism as the
giving of assistance at the battlefield, second, the Cold War period and humanitarianism’s
link to developmentalism, and third, the post Cold War period in which human rights
became the main focus of humanitarian aid and action. Haiti is a particularly interesting
site of humanitarian intervention because of the long history of international involvement
and the ways in which Haitians are represented in Western media and academia.
The first section of this chapter explores how humanitarianism, as a form of
intervention, has transformed due to changing interpretations of the role of the
humanitarian organization in the global system of nation-states. The second section will
discuss Haiti’s history of intervention. It will show that, on the one hand, the history of
intervention mirrors the larger changes and themes within the humanitarian industry. Yet,
the representational and discursive practices about Haiti (which I will discuss in chapter
three) have particular historical roots in previous international interventions in Haiti. The
last section will discuss the 2010 earthquake and the international response by focusing
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on four of the major humanitarian organizations (which includes the United States
military, operating in a “humanitarian” role), to illuminate how the international
community responded to the earthquake in light of the historical and political
developments influencing humanitarian operations and their move towards securitization.
How the world decides to respond to the seemingly endless number of crises and
emergencies is a reflection of the political, economic and social environment. For many
years humanitarianism was viewed as something entirely outside of politics: a salve for
the wounds of global inequalities, wars, and injustice. Michael Barnett (2005, 2008),
Joanna Macrae (2001) and Alex Bellamy (2003) write about how post Cold War
humanitarianism is being transformed into a more politicized form of intervention. I
argue, however, that the distance between politics and humanitarianism was never as
great as many assume.
Humanitarianism is by nature a form of intervention. Regardless of the
proclaimed apolitical and neutral foundation of humanitarianism, the very act of giving
aid reflects global structures, conflicts and power relations. The perceived simplicity of
giving humanitarian aid to persons in need reflects both global and domestic power
dynamics: Who is able to give aid? Who is deemed to be both worthy of and in need?
What form does aid come in, how should it be distributed, and for how long? The
questions reveal the inherently political, non-neutral nature of humanitarian aid. Hans
Haug in his book Humanity for All: The International Red Cross Red Crescent Movement
suggests that, “an institution or a movement is neutral when it renounces to participate in
a conflict or altercation and abstains from any interference” (1993: 3). His definition
defends of the neutrality of the Red Cross Red Crescent Movement. What I argue,
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however, is that providing humanitarian aid, by virtue of being a form of interference,
qualifies as participation in a conflict.
Relying on a definition of humanitarianism as intervention is not assigning a
negative or positive value to humanitarianism, but instead allows for a more critical and
nuanced analysis by placing humanitarian intervention in a political and historical
context. The point is not to make a judgment and then dole out praise or condemnation,
but instead to explore the complex history of intervention and consider the multiple
reasons states and international organizations decide to intervene and the multiple ways
in which they do. As humanitarianism changes in shape and form it is not transforming
into something entirely different, but is adapting and morphing in response to changing
relationships, situations, and discourses about who needs aid, and who has the ability and
knowledge to give it.
Haiti is an interesting case because it is considered a “failed state,” and behind
every humanitarian intervention, from food packets to military assistance, echo
sentiments of the failure of the state. The nation-state is expected to provide for and
protect its citizens and if a state is unable to respond adequately to crises and
emergencies, it is failing to provide for its citizens. Humanitarian intervention is the
action taken by state and non-state actors to respond to the state’s inability to respond.
Analysis of the changing discourses of why states have crises and why some states are
unable to adequately respond allows for an exploration of how humanitarianism both
shapes and is shaped by dominant discourses of international relations and the
international community.
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History of Humanitarianism as a Form of Intervention
This section explores how ideas about and interpretations of humanitarianism go in and
out of vogue depending on how organizations and states determine the causes of
humanitarian crises, as well as the relationships of nation-states to each other and to the
international community. Before proceeding to the historical analysis, it is important to
note that humanitarianism has not simply followed a linear path from simple to more
complex models. If one is to interpret all humanitarianism as an act of intervention, it
may, along with situating humanitarianism in a historical context, be constructive to think
of the types of humanitarian intervention as distributed along a spectrum. The giving of
food aid following a natural disaster may be a less intrusive form of intervention than
coordinating

and

funding

infrastructure

development

projects.

Development

interventions, like the provision of microcredit to women in rural areas with the stated
goal of “empowering women” is a less direct intervention than giving military aid to one
side in a civil war or interstate conflict, which in turn is less of an intervention than
military intervention in the name of human rights. However, they are all still forms of
intervention and each is the result of the political environment and conditions of the
conflict.
Humanitarianism will be loosely defined as an industry that is bureaucratically
structured to provide assistance to people who are affected, or could be affected, by
emergencies and crises (such as war, famine, extreme poverty or natural and man made
disasters) across international lines. The thesis will focus on how the international
humanitarian industry was created and perpetuated by international actors to deal with
events across international lines, with a concentration on internally displaced populations.
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By analyzing humanitarianism from this angle, the thesis will explore the relationships
between the actors giving humanitarian assistance and the actors receiving it. By focusing
particularly on issues of power, sovereignty and representational practices, I hope to offer
the beginnings of a critical history of humanitarianism. I will start the discussion with the
Red Cross Movement because it represents a particular moment in humanitarian
assistance, and for many years was the model for humanitarian organizations.
Henry Dunant started the Red Cross Movement in 1863. The Red Cross and Red
Crescent societies were not the first international humanitarian organizations, but their
foundation represents a critical turning point for humanitarianism (Haug 1993). The Red
Cross, which was envisioned by Dunant after witnessing the Battle of Solferino in 1859,
was created to provide assistance to people wounded in battle. According to A Memory of
Solferino published by the International Committee for the Red Cross,
In normal circumstances, in the organized society in which he usually lives, man
is protected by laws and finds sustenance close at hand. But there are also
situations, such as armed conflicts or natural disasters, when society is thrown out
of kilter, laws are violated, man’s natural environment is turned into chaos, and
his safety, health and very survival are threatened: in times like those the Red
Cross strives to help and protect the victims (Hay 1986: 1).
Populations throughout Europe quickly accepted the Red Cross Movement and began
forming their own national societies and many agreed that there was a need for an
international organization to address the human suffering caused by war. Before the Red
Cross, there were many humanitarian societies that addressed poverty and other social
ills, but the Red Cross represents a move toward the internationalization and
bureaucratization of what would eventually become a full-blown industry.
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The International Committee of the Red Cross is the international wing of the Red
Cross Movement. It is not affiliated with any particular state and it has a different
mandate and position from the Red Cross and Red Crescent societies, which are the
national organizations. Although National Red Cross and Red Crescent organizations
often have different mandates and provide different services, they are generally
concerned with direct service delivery. For example, during World War I, National Red
Cross societies provided ambulance services and medical personnel and supplies.
One of the main distinctions of the National Red Cross movements, like other
direct aid agencies like Doctors Without Borders (Medecins Sans Frontiers), is how and
to whom aid is distributed. Although life is rarely as clear-cut as policies might suggest,
direct aid delivery ideally has no conditions attached or long-term goals in mind. Red
Cross and MSF give aid, either as food packets or medical help to people in need.
Naturally, the determination of who is able to give aid and who deserves to receive it
reflect inherently unequal power relationships, but this type of aid is a more minor form
of intervention. The organizations generally view themselves as apolitical, or outside the
realm of politics.
An analysis of Red Cross documents from Haiti between 1970 and 1985, (chosen
because of their public availability), show little to no focus on the political situation in the
country at the time. In 1970, the ICRC helped the Haitian Red Cross open a blood bank.
In 1971 the ICRC sent “two tons of powdered milk for the Haitian medico-social
programme for the benefit of the waifs and strays of Cap-Haitien, and a Land Rover were
loaded on a ship sailing from Rotterdam to Port-au-Prince” (Library of Congress 1970).
In 1985 the ICRC sent a delegation to Haiti to explore the detention centers of political
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prisoners. The ICRC makes no mention of what it found during its expedition, but it did
determine how much food aid was needed for Haitian citizens. (Library of Congress
1985). Jean-Claude Duvalier was the president of Haiti in 1985 and it can be assumed
that the conditions of the political prisoners did not match with international expectations
and norms. However, the only aid that was ultimately distributed was food aid. This
distribution of food aid represents, first, the international community’s unwillingness to
comment on the conditions of Haiti under the dictatorship and second, the focus of the
ICRC on direct aid distribution instead of the protection of human rights.
Traditional humanitarian intervention has been criticized for not just failing to
address root causes of conflict, but also for fueling war. As Ben Barber has argued,
Large numbers of refugees menaced by starvation and disease make for pathos
and dramatic press that attract aid dollars from international humanitarian
organizations and foreign governments. The aid that flows to the camps where the
refugees are gathered can be skimmed by militants based in the camps, as well as
local business people and military and administrative officials of the host
government (1997: 8).
Barber’s criticism has been repeated many times. Humanitarian workers have themselves
expressed concern about the inability to determine who truly “deserves” aid and the perils
of giving aid to people who are “cheating the system” or are not entitled to aid. The
inability of humanitarian aid workers to determine who constitutes a combatant and who
is a civilian is a particularly salient and recurring “problem”. The phenomenon of
“guerilla wars” in which the lines between “enemies” and “innocents” is difficult to
decipher has been seen in Haiti. The violence in Haiti is spread out among the population
and is generally directed at supporters of one political group by another, with the military
switching between backing the government or anti-government forces. The difficulty in
distinguishing between deserving and not deserving has become so acute in Haiti that

16

even before the earthquake the entire population was treated as if they were potential
threats or combatants. Therefore, because the Haiti’s past humanitarian experiences,
when the earthquake hit, Haitians were considered a threat to themselves and to others
instead of merely disaster victims. This response by humanitarian organizations reveals
this representation of Haitians. I will discuss this issue in greater detail in the third
chapter.
The Red Cross and other emergency, need-based organizations were also
frequently criticized for their desire to not to choose sides in political conflicts and
remain “apolitical” despite the political nature of intervention. For example, the Red
Cross was criticized for not speaking out against Nazi concentration camps during World
War II (Esbrook 2007).2 Additionally, relief aid agencies are also criticized for not being
“capacity building” or for creating a cycle of dependency (Okaru-Bisant 1999, Bauer and
Sen 2001, Loxley and Sackey 2008). The stated “apolitical” nature of such organizations
requires they should directly give aid and not address the structural issues for why
countries need aid. This criticism came following the formal end of colonialism, when
poverty in the third world was seen as the cause for the emergencies and displacement.
The need for organizations to focus on the root causes allowed for a shift in
humanitarianism. However, there are many humanitarian organizations that still focus on
relief work. Following the end of WWII, developmentalism and its predecessor
modernization theory became the prevalent schools of thought for understanding why

2

Documents have surfaced following World War II that suggest the Red Cross societies were aware of the
conditions at the Nazi concentration camps, but for various reasons chose to not publicly speak out against
the camps.
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some countries are poor and in need of aid. Development and modernization arose from
the idea that societies can be ranked in stages, from the “traditional” underdeveloped
societies to the modern industrialized societies (Rostow 1990). In the 1950s and 1960s
development projects focused on modernizing infrastructures in the “third world.”
The development paradigm has undergone a variety of changes since the 1950s
but the underlying assumption remains the same: Some countries are underdeveloped or
developing, whereas others have become developed. It is up to the developed countries,
and their humanitarian organizations, to help the developing societies “catch up.”
Although it is beyond the scope of this thesis to fully engage in criticisms of
developmentalism, I bring up development because it is a form of “humanitarian
intervention” from the international community. The attempt of humanitarian
organizations to develop a country, society or community reflects the desire of the
organization to help the populations “develop” in the image of Western nation-states.
Developmentalism is a means of intervening in the economic policies, social structures,
and governance of the population.
Developmentalism arose from the inability of international humanitarian
institutions to address the root causes of emergencies and the displacement of populations
(Rostow 1990). Following the World Wars, as many crises shifted to the newly
independent colonies, states and international organizations adjusted many of their
policies to address why some countries need aid and why some do not. This relates to the
issue discussed earlier, namely the ability of a state to respond to its own emergencies. As
colonialism ended and inequalities between nation states became more pronounced, the
humanitarian industry shifted its focus to reflect this perceived inability of less developed
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states to adequately respond to humanitarian crises. The level, amount or perhaps
character of humanitarian intervention changed to adapt to the emerging development
discourse.
Global economic development proved to be a more difficult task than originally
perceived. Communities and countries that were targets of development programs did not
always develop economically. According to Ovaska (2003),
Even though some countries, notably in East Asia, have managed to break out of
poverty, many of the poorest countries have actually seen their real per capita
incomes decline since the 1970s. More than one billion people still live on less
than $1 a day. Many of the advances in basic health care and education in the last
few decades have been negated by the rapid spread of HIV/AIDS, particularly in
the world’s poorest countries (175).
The inability of countries to overcome poverty despite the large amounts of money,
experts, and technology flowing from rich to poor countries led to questions about the
causes of poverty. Why were some countries able to “develop” whereas others were not?
One infamous story about developmentalism gone awry is that of the elimination
of the Haitian black pigs during the 1980s. “Starting in May 1982, all of Haiti’s pigs were
slaughtered to prevent an epidemic of African swine fever from spreading to the U.S.
mainland (to this day, Haitians point to this episode as a proof of a giant U.S. conspiracy
to destroy Haiti)” (Girard 2002: 30). Joan Dayan, in A Few Stories about Haiti, or,
Stigma Revisited (2004) describes how the United States encouraged the Haitian
government to destroy the black pigs:
Black pigs, also known as "creole pigs," had always been the staple of the
peasant’s life in the countryside. Black pigs were basic, necessary, and blessed. A
few years before "Baby" Doc left for exile, the US Health Department warned
about the dangers of a swine flu epidemic in Haiti. Hundreds of peasants lost their
black pigs, their primary means of living (172).
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The creole pigs were small and able to survive on the mountainous ranges of Haiti. The
large, white Iowa pigs sent from the United States to replace the creole pigs were unable
to survive. They needed expensive food and were unable to scavenge for themselves in
the mountains. Most of the pigs either died or were sent to live on farms that were able to
properly provide for them. This story is not just about pigs, or even about the United
States’ insistence on providing development assistance without the background
knowledge about whether their methods are compatible with the local environment. It
also reflects the power that the United States health department had over the Haitian
state. The ability to convince a government to kill all of its peasant’s pigs speaks volumes
about the role the United States government has in the management of the Haitian state.
Economic development was the major focus of humanitarian intervention during
the Cold War period. Developmentalism certainly still exists today, and other types of
humanitarian intervention, such as direct aid or military intervention also existed during
the Cold War, but during that period two issues in particular influenced the discourses of
humanitarian intervention. The first was the stalemate within the United Nations and the
Security Council. The Security Council, which is made up of five permanent members
(China, France, United Kingdom, Russia, and the United States), was established with the
stated aim of maintaining peace and security (Charter of the United Nations, Chapter V,
1945). Military interventions in third world countries had a different nature and reflected
the power struggles between Cold War actors. The second issue was the idea of fighting
poverty as a means of fighting the Cold War. Third world countries were seen as the
battleground of communism and capitalism, where different parties attempted to develop
countries to prove the supremacy of their ideology. As Murphey writes, “Ideological
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divergences virtually prevented the Security Council from acting in cases of outright
aggression, let alone in cases involving widespread deprivations of internationally
recognized human rights” (1996: 84).
The rise in the prominence of human rights discourses came with the decline of
the Cold War politics. Human rights are defined by proponents as “rights held by
individuals simply because they are part of the human species. They are rights shared
equally be everyone regardless of sex, race, nationality, and economic development.
They are universal in content” (Ishay 2008: 3). The 1990s saw a dramatic increase in the
popularity of the Human Rights Regime, defined by Thomas Buergenthal as consisting
of,
a web of institutions and mechanisms, and of an ever-expanding body of
international human rights norms. The institutions and norms that constitute the
UN human rights regime have their source in the UN Charter and the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights on the one hand and in a series of UN human rights
treaties on the other. (1997: 1).
The 1990s also witnessed a rise in the number of human rights interventions. As the Cold
War stalemate in the United Nations Security Council dissolved, intervening in the name
of human rights violations became increasingly justified. Human rights organizations
proliferated and by the 1990s,
you couldn’t escape it. The better-known Western organizations-the International
Commission of Jurists, Amnesty International, and Human Rights Watch-roamed
the globe looking for infractions. NATO prosecuted a war in the name of "human
rights." Less well known to Europeans and North Americans were the hundreds of
NGOs outside Europe and the United States defining themselves as human rights
agencies, almost all of them with birth dates no earlier than 1985 (Cmiel 2004:
117).
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According to Ottaway and Lacina (2003), the number of United Nations peacekeeping
missions, or interventions in the name of peace or human rights, has increased
dramatically. From the creation of the UN in 1945 to 1989 there were fifteen
peacekeeping missions and all but three were interstate. However, from 1989 to 2003
there were forty missions and only seven of them were interstate. These numbers do not
include the number of state-led interventions that were approved by the United Nations
but deployed by individual states or coalitions of states (Ottaway and Lacina 2003).
Additionally, as humanitarian organizations became larger and better able to deal
with complex issues, and as traditional forms of humanitarianism continued to fail to end
or prevent conflict or massive population displacement, the human rights regime is
increasingly framed as the manner in which the international community should respond.
For example, Tanja Schumer (2008) writes, “The British variant of New
Humanitarianism extends beyond the immediate mandate of traditional humanitarian
emergency assistance to save life. It is intended to address the root causes of conflict,
prevent the negative side effects of aid and support human rights” (1). Schumer uses
“new humanitarianism” to describe how humanitarianism has changed in response to the
human rights discourses.
It follows that if states, humanitarian organizations or human rights advocacy
groups are unable to bring about human rights, it is then up to the international
community to step in and force governments to uphold the human rights principles.
Human rights and humanitarianism are now framed as broad justifications for military
intervention:
U.S. military interventions since the Cold War have been in response to
humanitarian crises. In the past traditional civilian relief organizations could
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handle them with a good degree of success. Unfortunately contemporary
humanitarian crises tend to result from internal conflicts that produce
environments so unstable and so violent that relief organizations are unable to
operate effectively (DiPrizio 2002: 3).
Changes in the discourses of international affairs, from poverty elimination to protecting
human rights has led to an increase in the use of military force in the name of human
rights. As Rony Brauman (2004) notes,
The Kosovo war provided the occasion for an extreme intensification of
humanitarian rhetoric in its most militaristic version. The armed intervention was
intended, or so it appeared, to “prevent a humanitarian crisis” (Jacques Chirac) by
means of bombings similarly qualified as “humanitarian” (Vaclav Havel): charged
with the task of maintaining spaces of humanity at the heart of the war,
humanitarianism became a clear source of legitimization for violence (397).
With the end of the Cold War and decolonization and emergent human rights
regime, issues of state sovereignty came to the fore in ways that have not done before.
The debate between human rights or state sovereignty is often posed as a dichotomy in
which one must choose a side, either for or against humanitarian intervention, either for
state sovereignty or for an international human rights regime. Jennifer Welsh (2004)
discusses the perceived conflict between human rights and state sovereignty as follows:
“At the heart of the debate is the alleged tension between the principle of state
sovereignty, a defining pillar of the United Nations system and international law, and the
evolving international norms related to human rights and the use of force” (1). The
international human rights regime is designed to protect the rights of persons who do not
have the protection of their own state. However, this is more difficult than it appears. As
Hannah Arendt remarked:
The Rights of Man, after all, had been defined as “inalienable” because they were
supposed to be independent of all governments; but it turned out that the moment
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human beings lacked their own government and had to fall back upon their
minimum rights, no authority was left to protect them and no institution was
willing to guarantee them (1958: 292).
Despite the attempts of the international community to internationalize a human rights
regime, human rights instead are often only enforceable as citizen rights. The state is thus
in charge of the protection of the “human rights” of its citizens, but when a state fails to
do so, the international community is now expected, at least in some cases, to intervene
on behalf of the populations who are no longer receive human rights from their country.
The United Nations and other humanitarian institutions attempt to step in when
governments fail, but despite their claim of impartiality they are still reflections of the
very nation-state system of which they are attempting to subvert, because human rights
are ultimately only enforceable by states.
The rise in the popularity and frequency of military interventions in the name of
human rights has led many to bemoan the decline of original humanitarian principles.
This is not necessarily the case. Perhaps human rights has been embraced by political
actors who support military intervention, but this reflects not a complete shift in
humanitarianism from apolitical to political, but instead indicates how humanitarianism
has evolved in the last one hundred years. Intervention in the affairs of other states does
not represent the break down of national sovereignty nor does it represent the
globalization of a human rights regime. Absolute state sovereignty never truly existed
and human rights interventions focus on the state as the main reason to intervene. In nonUN interventions it is nation states intervening on the behalf of populations who no
longer have the protection of their own state and UN interventions are in the name of the
nation-states that make up the UN and reflect the goals and intentions of these states.
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Military humanitarian intervention has normalized the use of force in the name of
human rights and humanitarianism. The justifications for the use of military and security
mechanisms has been formalized and adopted by humanitarian organizations as human
rights violations have become synonymous with security threats. Humanitarian
organizations, backed by nation states are deployed to eliminate threats in conflict-ridden
areas, once defined as states in the midst of war, though the definition is now being
expanded to include countries that have been affected by natural disasters. In the
following section, I will first outline of the history of Haiti and international intervention
in Haiti, and end with the beginning of an analysis on the humanitarian response to the
earthquake in 2010.
Haiti’s History of Intervention
No history of Haiti would be complete without attention to the implications of
intervention (humanitarian or otherwise). For the purposes of this thesis I will focus
mostly on the history of foreign intervention in Haiti. This section will provide both a
historical context to the response to the Haitian earthquake as well as an historical
overview of the relationship between Haiti and the international community.
Understanding how the international community responded to the 2010 Haiti earthquake
does not require a linear historical explanation, where we can explain the earthquake and
its response by placing blame on a particular actors or historical events. For example,
colonialism is not the sole cause of Haiti’s inability to cope with natural disasters.
Instead, I hope to explore how the representations of Haiti both historically and currently
reflect and influence the international community’s understanding of and relationship
with Haiti and its people.
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Dominant narratives of the history of Haiti begin with the first foreign
interventions in the 15th century (Garrigus 2006, Bellegarde-Smith 1990). Starting with
the first traces of colonialism in the 17th century I will discuss each era of intervention in
Haiti’s history, showing that although the methods, representations, and justifications for
intervention may have changed, Haiti has experienced near-constant intervention by
outside powers. Its viability as an independent country has always been questioned, and
while the term “failed state” has only been applied relatively recently, Haiti has long been
treated as a state incapable of providing for its citizens.
Representations of the Haitian people and Haiti as a state have remained relatively
unchanged in content. Haiti was the first black republic, achieving independence in 1804.
From its inception it was seen as a threat to other slave-owning nations (BellegardeSmith 1990), especially the United States. Fears that the Haitian rebellion would spread
to the United States struck a chord with white politicians and slave owners. Haiti was
seen as a threat to international stability and to the wealth generated by owning slaves
(Langley 1996).

The first hundred years of the Haitian republic were marked by

violence, instability, and deadly revolutions and the world continued to fear that the
Haitian unrest and instability would spread. The Haitian people were seen as barbarians,
and as voodoo practicing, illiterate peasants. Outsiders described Haitians’ revolutions
and coups d’état as angry Haitian mobs wielding sabers (Girard 2005). The foreign
intervention in Haiti from colonialism, to the 150 million francs in debt owed to France
(Bellegarde-Smith 1990), to the embargos, and to full blown United States intervention in
the early 1900s (Schmidt 1995) and then again in the 1990s (Zanotti 2008) was and
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continues to be justified by the portrayal of Haitians as unable to rule themselves, as
threats to international stability, as threats to themselves and to those intervening.
Haiti is located in the Caribbean on the island of Hispaniola. Haiti borders the
Dominican Republic in the west. See map below.

(source: http://www.worldmapnow.com/haiti-map.html)

Colonialism
Colonialism is an overt and obvious form of intervention and for hundreds of
years, Haiti has been influenced and affected by foreign intervention. During colonialism,
the French controlled almost all aspects of statecraft (Girard 2005). The economy was
export oriented and the vast majority of the population was of African descent, brought to
the country by the slave trade (Bellegard-Smith 1990).
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The colonization of the island of Hispaniola began in 1492, when Christopher
Columbus claimed the island for Spain. The native population of Hispaniola, the Tainos,
was quickly decimated by both European diseases and enslavement by the Spanish. By
the 1600s most inhabitants of Hispaniola were predominately African slaves and their
decedents. By the mid 1600s, one third of the island was given to France and in 1664 the
French West India Company took control. Over the next two hundred years, the western
area of Hispaniola, then called Saint-Domingue, became one of the most prosperous
colonies in the new world, exporting vast amounts of sugar, coffee, cotton and Indigo.
(Girard 2005). The number of African slaves far outnumbered the white European
settlers, and due to the frequent taking of slave women as concubines, a new class was
created, the mulattoes. Called the “free colored population” (Garrigus 2006: 4), they were
able to own property, unlike the lower class of African slaves. By the 1700s many of the
“free colored” men had vast plantations and owned hundreds of slaves (Garrigus 2006).
The evils of colonialism have long been explored in academic work (Bhabha
1990, Said 1994, Fanon 2004, Spivak 2010) and an in-depth description is unnecessary.
The inhabitants of Haiti, like many other post-colonial states, suffered immensely from
the colonial system and the effects of colonialism are still felt today. There are a few
major points that are necessary for this thesis to discuss concerning Haiti and its colonial
history. First, colonialism completely changed the island of Hispaniola. Not only did
colonialism change the economy of Haiti to an export oriented satellite of France, but
also it changed the way society was organized. The large slave population was not native
to the area and was kept in subordination to the much smaller white population.
Colonialism restructured society into an extremely hierarchal system where the elites
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controlled not only the natural resources, economy, and the government, but they also
controlled the vast majority of the population, first as slaves, then after the revolution as
laborers. As Langley (1996) writes, “With its forty thousand whites, thirty thousand free
coloreds, and five hundred thousand African slaves, the colony possessed the tiered social
structure ordinarily found in sugar plantation economies” (106).
Second, colonialism has had a lasting effect on how the international community
perceives Haiti. Despite, or likely because of the revolution, Haiti has been perceived as a
threat to the international community. The treatment of Haiti and Haitians by the
international community has always been affected by this perception. There always exists
a duality in the treatment of Haiti. On one hand Haitians are perceived as threatening;
they are violent, mob like, devil worshipping, corrupt and militaristic. On the other hand,
they are pitiful, voiceless and depraved. Haiti and Haitians are both feared and pitied in
the same breath. I will discuss the representations of the Haitian state and its people in
chapter three, but it is important to note that this representation is related to colonialism,
racism, and the role of the international community in Haiti.
The Haitian Revolution
Understanding the Haitian revolution requires understanding the global political context
at the time. The American Revolution ended in 1783 and the French revolution ended in
the 1799. A civil war in Haiti broke out in 1790 following the onset of the French
revolution, as both white and mulatto slave owners considered the implications of the
new French laws would have on the colony. The revolution began a year later, after the
mulatto claims for civil and political rights were denied. However, within a year the
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French had aligned with the mulatto class against the slaves, temporarily pausing the war.
The wars and revolutions in Europe gave the Haitian slaves a second chance the
following year. As Philippe Girard argues,
Events in faraway Europe gave the slaves a second opportunity to free
themselves. In 1793, the French revolution took a more radical turn- a tribunal
sent Louis XVI to the guillotine, and all the conservative monarchies of Europe
declared war on France. For the slaves, general war meant two things. First,
France’s multifront war would leave few troops available for colonial duty should
a new uprising erupt. Second the revolution’s leftist turn brought to the fore
politicians sincerely dedicated to freedom and the equality of man (2005: 38).
As the war went on in Europe, British and Spanish troops arrived in Saint Dominque in
hopes of taking the island for their own colonial interests. The Haitian revolt, under the
General Toussaint Louverture defeated the British and Spanish troops. In 1793, France
abolished slavery in an attempt to stabilize the country. By 1801 Louverture was in
charge of the entire island of Hispaniola. Napoleon Bonaparte, hoping to reinstitute
slavery, sent troops in 1801 to reclaim the island. The French were victorious initially,
and Louverture was exiled in 1802. Yet the war swung back in favor of the Haitians in
1803 because of a series of setbacks to France. France went back to war with England,
the French troops in Haiti died rapidly of yellow fever, and the British and American
troops came to the aid of Haitian revolutionaries. In November 1803 it became clear that
the French would not win the war. In 1804, Haiti became the first black republic, and the
second country in the hemisphere to break away from its colonial powers.
Interestingly, the Haitian revolution was beneficial to the United States as well.
Haiti was one of the few countries the young United States could trade with, and its
defeat of France helped the United States gain the Louisiana territory. Many colonial
powers, not just France, had a vested interest in Haiti during the years of revolution. On
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one hand, the British and Spanish wanted France to lose its grip on Saint Dominque
because its loss would aid them in their wars with France. On the other hand, European
colonial powers feared the slave revolts would spread to their own Caribbean colonies.
The Haitian revolution was a complex historical event. Each of the parties involved were
in a constant state of flux and loyalties changed frequently. Sometimes the Haitian slaves
fought beside the French, British or Spanish troops, sometimes they fought against them.
Ultimately at the end of the revolution, the general mood was one of great distrust of
Europeans and Americans. In the new black republic, the constitution stated that white
people were unable to own property and land, and the systematic violence that was so
rampant during colonialism and the long revolution was perpetuated against white settlers
still residing in the country (Bellegarde-Smith 1990).
Post Revolution Haiti
“The Existence of Negro people in arms, occupying a country it has soiled by the most criminal acts, is a
horrible spectacle for all white nations.”
French foreign Minister Prince Charles Talleyrand calling for the United States to embargo Haiti
(Lupin 1968).

The years following the Haitian revolution were marked by instability both abroad and at
home. Few countries accepted Haiti’s legitimacy immediately and many European
countries and the United States placed trade embargos on the fledgling state. France only
recognized Haiti in 1825 after Haitian President Jean Pierre Boyer agreed to pay 150
million Francs to France for the latter’s loss of property (Bellegarde-Smith 1990). The
sum was later reduced to 60 million, but it took almost 100 years for Haiti to repay the
debt (Bellegarde-Smith 1990). The Haitian customhouses were the “sole source of
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revenue and, until 1915 [the year of the United States occupation], serviced the foreign
debt to the tune of 80 percent, leaving 20 percent of revenues for all other state
expenditures” (Bellegarde-Smith 1990: 73). The final payment for the debt to France was
made in 1922 (Bellegarde-Smith).
Due to pressures from the United States government, Haiti was not allowed to
attend the first Inter-American Panama Congress in 1826. The United States did not
recognize Haiti until 1862, nearly 60 years after the end of the Haitian revolution, when
United States President Abraham Lincoln abolished slavery. From the onset of Haiti’s
establishment as a republic, the international community ostracized it, though it must be
noted, still traded with it. Fear that the unrest and slave revolts would migrate to
neighboring countries, and a general and widespread racism against the “black menace”
(Bellegard-Smith 1990: 52) led to mistrust of Haiti by many countries. Additionally,
much like Liberia, Haiti became a destination point for black Americans. Around 6,000
Americans of African descent went to Haiti under the Free Black Immigration act. Most
either died or returned to the United States within a few years because of disease and heat
exhaustion (Locket 1991).
The poor relationship with the international community and the large debt that
Haiti owed to France helped to systematically change how Haitian society was structured
as an early republic. The first is the creation of a militarized society. Fears that France or
another colonial power could return led to an increase in the military capacity of Haiti.
The new country focused heavily on creating a strong military to defend itself against
both foreign invaders, but also against internal opposition groups (Bellegarde-Smith
1990). This militarization likely contributed to the multiple violent coups d’état and
32

general political unrest. Opposition was met with a strong hand and generally responded
with an equal display of aggression.
In addition to the militarization of the early Haitian republic, the lack of
international recognition and the debt owed to France also led to the institution of an
economic class system similar to slavery, which reinforced the already existing class
distinctions. Joan Dayan explains how the militarization and class structures contributed
to the underdevelopment of Haiti:
It was Boyer’s Rural Code of Haiti … that most contributed to the legacy of
militarism and compulsory labor that would continue to undermine Haitian
democracy. This code of laws which figured containment as fundamental to the
order of society reduced most Haitians, especially those who did not occupy
positions of rank in the military or civil branches of the state, to essential slave
status. A small fraction of Haiti’s population lived off the majority, collecting fees
– with the help of the rural chefs de section- for the sale travel, and butchering of
animals, and even for the cutting of trees (2004: 6)
Dayan later goes on to quote Louis-Joseph Janvier as saying the code in Haiti was
“slavery without the whip” (2004: 6).
The international community’s refusal to recognize Haiti and the overt racism in
their policies toward the country, the militarization of Haitian society, the constant coups
d’état, the reinforcement of colonial-style class distinctions, and the insistence on an
export-oriented economy to pay back France’s 60 million Franc debt all contributed to
the impoverishment of the majority of Haitian civilians and the destabilization of the
Haitian state and economy.
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United States Intervention and Occupation (1915-1934)
“Dear me, think of it! Niggers speaking French!”
Oft quoted statement by U.S. Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan in 1914 (Allen 1930)

The first United States occupation of Haiti officially began following the assassination of
Haitian President Vilbrun Guillaume Sam on July 27, 1915. The United States Marines
were already docked at Haitian ports prior to his assassination, and letters from as early
as 1914 had been written to the Haitian government from the United States detailing the
United States intentions, and suggesting the United States occupation had been in the
works for at least two years (Schmidt 1995). The Haitians had seen almost every single
one of their leaders assassinated or deposed in the hundred years since independence.
Why did the United States choose 1915 to occupy Haiti? The intervention came at a time
when the United States was gearing up to join World War One. Its main enemy was
Germany, and there were many German businessmen who lived in Haiti (Schmidt 1995).
American politicians were interested in securing the Caribbean against the spread of the
European war into Haiti. Other Caribbean nations, like Cuba, Panama, the Dominican
Republic, and Puerto Rico had already witnessed American occupations. Additionally,
the economic, political and military power of the United States was being consolidated.
Prior to World War I the United States was on the cusp of being one of the wealthiest and
most powerful countries in the world (Schmidt 1995). In order to cement this power, the
United States needed to have a strong hold in the Caribbean, both politically and
economically.
Though many politicians were frank about the need to open up Haiti to foreign
investments through occupation, there was also the underlying glow of a civilizing
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mission. United States President Woodrow Wilson’s desire to make the world safe for
democracy was often used to justify and encourage the occupation. Wilson’s,
frequent insistence that the United States had a moral responsibility to promote
constitutional democratic government in the Caribbean area... the belief that
Haitians were inherently inferior, coupled with the dictates of state department
diplomacy in the Caribbean, led to grotesque perversion of the declared
missionary ideal of spreading liberal democracy. Indeed, the occupation, in the
process of exercising unwelcome foreign military domination, consistently
suppressed local democratic institutions and denied elementary political liberties.
Wilson”s obsession with order, stability and constitutionalism, implying
government by law and the sanctity of legal contracts, was translated into rigid
authoritarianism based on the assertion that Haitians were incapable of selfgovernment (Schmidt 1995: 10)
This civilizing mission also included “modernizing” the country and its people.
Modernizing Haiti meant building roads, developing agribusiness, and educating the
upper middle class. All three proved difficult, and in the end only the first two were
successful. Building roads and railroads was accomplished by reinstating the Corvée, a
law from the mid 1800s that required that Haitians either pay a tax or be forced to build
roads through mandatory labor (Schmidt 1995). As most Haitians were unable to pay the
taxes, they were conscripted into forced labor. The roads were built, but the cruel
enforcement echoed Haiti’s legacy of slavery. The second modernization project,
developing agribusiness, required a change in the Haitian constitution to allow white
foreigners to own land. With American military pressures, a new constitution was passed
in 1918 allowing foreigners to own property (Schmidt 1995). The roads and the new
constitution each stood to consolidate the American power over Haiti and opened Haiti
up for American economic interests. The education program failed due to a lack of
participation and interest by the Haitians chosen for the education loans.
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Most Haitians were displeased with the United States occupation. Both peasants
and middle class Haitians began revolting. This began the Caco Wars of liberation, which
lasted from 1915 to 1934. The United States called the wars “guerilla wars,” a term
which signifies a lack of clarity regarding who is partaking in the revolt and who is a
civilian. The Caco Wars were frequently met with Marine brutality, but continued for
most of the occupation (Schmidt 1995). As a result, the United States Marines began
training the Haitian military to help control and stabilize the country. The control and
strength of the Haitian military would reach its peak during the Duvalier years and would
only be halted in the 1990s by UN and NATO peacekeeping troops when the Haitian
military was dismantled (Zanotti 2008). The United States Marine violence was not only
accepted by United States politicians but also lauded. In November of 1915, United
States forces killed every Haitian soldier during a battle at Fort Riviere. The General who
oversaw the slaughter received the Congressional Medal of Honor. During the United
States occupation, fifteen percent of Haiti’s two million population fled to the Dominican
Republic or Cuba3.
Although the United States officially left in 1934, its presence has been felt in
Haiti ever since, whether through international aid, humanitarian organizations, support
of presidents, or more military troops. The two countries also remain connected by the
large Haitian Diaspora residing in the United States, on whose remittances many Haitians
survive.

3

Compare this number with the recent U.S. occupation in Iraq. According to most censes the war has
caused around 7% of the Iraqi population to flee Iraq to neighboring countries.
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The Duvalier Years: Papa and Baby Doc
“I know the Haitian people because I am the Haitian people.”
Infamous Quote by Haitian President Francois Duvalier

The Duvalier dictatorship that began with the election of Francois Duvalier (Papa
Doc) in 1957 and ended with the removal of his son, Jean-Claude Duvalier (Baby Doc),
in 1986 marks a particularly violent and disturbing period in Haiti’s history. Although the
country was traditionally run by dictators, loosely defined as those not democratically
elected and whose base of power is limited to an oligarchy supported by the military, the
Duvalier years still stand out as particularly repressive. However, as with the other
sections in the historical examination of Haiti, I will attempt to stress that the context and
backdrop of Papa and Baby Doc’s twenty-nine-year reign is almost as important as the
brutality and force they used to maintain power.
In this section, I will not go into great detail concerning the means by which the
Duvalier regime maintained power domestically. For this I recommend Haiti, State
Against Nation: The Origins and Legacy of Duvalierism by Michel Rolph Trouillot
(1990) and Papa Doc: Haiti and Its Dictator by Bernard Diederich and Al Burt (1990)
and instead will discuss how international involvement helped create the conditions that
enabled them to take and hold on to power. In no way do I believe or support a theory
that the international community created the Duvalier dictatorships. Instead, I hope to
shed light on the roles various actors played ad suggest that if we wish to understand the
brutality of the dictatorship, we cannot look at it through an ahistorical lens.
Prior to Francois Duvalier’s election Haiti was experiencing relative stability. The
lack of political upheaval and the increase in foreign aid money gave the appearance that
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Haiti was improving. However, a growing economic crisis was facing the country.
Agriculture represented eighty seven percent of the GNP, yet environmental degradation
and overpopulation in rural areas was increasing, leading to a subsequent increase in
migration to Port Au Prince (Trouillot 1990). An economy based on export-oriented
agriculture is particularly sensitive to both the international economy and the effects of
nature. Severe droughts, coupled with floods and hurricanes frequently disrupt the
production of agricultural goods, while international instability can affect the price
market. The massive migrations to Port Au Prince not only further impoverished the
urban areas, it also paved the way for Duvalier to later increase manufacturing as a major
industry.
When Duvalier was “elected” he was, according to some an unassuming and
“stupid” man (Trouillot 1990). This perception helped him win supporters in the military
who thought he could be easily manipulated. A rural doctor, who was not a mulatto, did
have a base of support. Few could have guessed he would later go on to kill between
twenty and fifty thousand Haitians, force one fifth of the population to flee the country,
and routinely beat and imprison anyone who was seen as a threat to his power (Trouillot
1990). His power was consolidated by his use of both the military and the Volunteers for
National Security, popularly known as the Tontons Macoutes. The military was, as
previously mentioned, created and trained by the United States Marines who continued to
support it during the Duvalier reign. (Schmidt 1995).
The United States also supported the Duvalier regime with international aid, an
example of the previously discussed influence of Cold War politics. Cold War tensions
led to the United States supporting dictatorships over Communist governments, and Papa
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Doc manipulated this doctrine to maintain United States and United Nations support. The
United States,
provided $7 million in economic aid to the Duvalier government between
February and September 1959 and almost $11 million in 1960. U.S. aid amounted
to $13.5 million, almost 50 percent of the Haitian national budget, in 1961 alone,
and from 1957 to 1986, U.S. aid to the Duvalier regime may have amounted to as
much as $900 million. As late as 1983, 40 percent of the Haitian government’s
budget and 60 percent of its development funds came from Western governments,
including $54 million from the United States. Thus the Duvalier regime could ill
afford to alienate its foreign benefactors in major areas affecting their economic
interests. (Bellegard-Smith 1990: 100).
The Duvalier regime is a dark time in Haiti’s history. We cannot, however, see it as an
exceptional or isolated event, for it was able to emerge in the context of Haiti’s past, both
domestic and international and the geopolitical realities of the Cold War period. We can
not only think of Papa and Baby Doc as cruel megalomaniacs, but must also understand
that their rise to and consolidation of power is rooted in the history of a country that has
long been plagued by both internal political upheaval and external intervention.
Aristide
Following Baby Doc’s ousting, power struggles resumed. New leaders followed
much the same path as those who came before them, and none lasted very long as
political coups replaced one dictator with another. As the political elite grabbed at power,
a priest by the name of Jean-Bertrand Aristide was preaching in the streets against the
Duvalierists, and then later their successors. Aristide, who was president three separate
times (first in 1991, from 1994- 1996, and then 2001-2004), is an enigmatic character in
Haiti’s long history of leaders. There are multiple books and articles written about the expresident and they generally fall into one of two camps: Aristide as the savior or Aristide
as the despot (Horton and Summerskill 2007). Although I will not engage fully in an
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exploration of the two arguments, it is striking how clearly the lines are drawn. I will
attempt to focus on the international involvement in the election, coups against and
returns of President Aristide instead of attempting to evaluate his personality or purposes.
In 1990 Aristide was “democratically elected” which can be defined in this case as
receiving 67 percent of the popular vote and the fact that the elections were monitored by
the OAS, the UN, and the Carter Center, which as Zartman argues, “contributed to their
fairness and to the subsequent sense of responsibility and engagement of the international
organizations as well” (Zartman 2005: 183). Aristide was overthrown in a military coup
just eight months later. The military junta ruled from September 1991 to September of
1994, and was unofficially led by Army General Raoul Cedras, with Joseph Nerrete
serving as the official president. Emmanuel Constant, was the founder of the Front for the
Advancement and Progress of Haiti (FRAPH) party, which was created to eliminate
Aristide supporters. Constant was on the C.I.A. pay roll for a number of years, providing
essential information about the political elites in Haiti (Girard 2004).
The international community, specifically the Organization of American States
(OAS) decided to take action on this “assault on democracy” by first enacting an
unsuccessful trade embargo (Girard 2004). The initial embargo was limited to weapons
and oil, but was later expanded to include most things that were not humanitarian in
nature. The embargo did not encourage the military junta to step down, but did hurt poor
Haitians and further widened the gap between the rich and the poor. Following the
unsuccessful embargo, the United States, with the support of the United Nations, set in
motion a military intervention that would overthrow the junta and reinstate the
democratically elected Aristide.
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Although “restoring democracy” and protecting human rights were largely cited
as the reasons for the 1994 occupation, it is relatively clear that there were multiple
reasons for President Bill Clinton’s decision to intervene. The United States had just
recently led a disastrous mission in Somalia, and though at first hesitant to make the same
mistake twice, the administration did want to preserve the United States” post-Cold War
reputation as a super power (Girard 2004). The United States was also, at least nominally,
concerned about drug trafficking. President Clinton was also concerned about the support
of the Congressional Black Caucus and other influential Aristide supporters. Finally, the
United States was deeply concerned with illegal immigration (Girard 2004). Fear of the
Haitian migration is arguably one of the major reasons the United States ultimately
decided to intervene. Unwilling to accept the Haitian immigrants, but also unwilling to
support the junta, the American government was in a difficult position as to how to deal
with the “boat people.” As Major Kent Simon writes in Two Strikes: American
Intervention in Haiti, “The immigration and humanitarian crises created by the Haitian
military certainly pulled at the heartstrings of American society” (Kent 2002: 44). In his
speech prior to the invasion, Clinton stated the following,
Just four years ago the Haitian people held the first free and fair elections since
their independence… But eight months later, Haitian dreams of democracy
became a nightmare of bloodshed… No American should be surprised that the
recent tide of migrants seeking refuge on our shores comes from Haiti and Cuba.
After all, they are the only nations left in the Western Hemisphere where
democratic government is denied; the only countries where dictators have
managed to hold back the wave of democracy that has swept our entire region,
and that our government has so actively promoted and supported for years…
History has taught us that preserving democracy in our own hemisphere
strengthens America’s security and prosperity… May God bless the people the
United States and the cause of freedom (Clinton 1994).
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It would be politically incorrect to directly admit that one of the major reasons for going
to war is to prevent immigration, but it is still apparent in the speeches and policies that
preventing more illegal immigration and avoiding giving refugee status to the perhaps
hundreds of thousands of Haitians played a large part in the final decision to intervene.
As Major Kent’s quote earlier suggests, immigration pulls at the heartstrings of American
society. The situation of intervening to avoid illegal immigration was mirrored again
following the 2004 Haitian uprising, and again after the 2010 earthquake.
In the short term, the 1994 intervention was largely considered successful. The
“peacekeeping operation” was able to end the military rule and reinstated Aristide as
president. The long-term results, however, are dubious. The long-term goal of sustaining
peace and state building proved insufficient, as four years after Aristide was elected a
second time, he was overthrown in another rebellion. Throughout the 1990s the UN,
OAS, and the United States played a major role in training a new police force. The
Haitian military, long seen as a major factor in the country’s violence and record of
human rights violations, was systematically dismantled. Soldiers were trained to become
police officers and the judicial system was changed to a “Western” model of rule of law
(Zanotti 2004).
The 2004 Uprising and the creation of MINUSTAH
After the reinstatement of Aristide in 1994, the UN and other multinational forces
maintained a steady involvement in Haiti. The first peacekeeping operation, United
Nations Mission in Haiti (UNWIH) was established in 1993 and in 1994 the Security
Council authorized a multinational police force to “maintain a secure and stable
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environment in the country, and promote the rule of law” (United Nations MINUSTAH
2011). Due to wavering support of members in the UN Security Council, the
peacekeeping troops rarely reached the full-intended capacity and Haiti saw over five
different “peacekeeping missions” from 1994-2004.
In June of 1995 Aristide’s party, Lavalas (“flood” in Creole), won a sweeping
reelection victory. Rene Preval, a political ally of Aristide, was elected president. In
1996, however, Aristide broke his alliance with Preval and started the Lavalas Family
party. The break caused a deadlock in Haiti’s politics until the 2000 elections when
Aristide was reelected. According to the UN, the “instability” in Haiti waxed and waned
during these years. Aristide was, at times, viewed as being cooperative and willing to
compromise with the international community and Haitian political elites, and at other
times as being a problem for the UN and its peacekeeping missions in Haiti (Einsiedel
and Malone 2006). Sebastian Einsiedel and David Malone suggest, “The UN’s efforts
were severely undermined by Aristide, who turned out to be an increasingly unhelpful
and unreliable partner, and by other Haitian political actors” (2006: 160).
The goals and mandates of the peacekeeping missions in Haiti prior to the
peacekeeping mission MINUSTAH were broad and according to Einsidel and Malone,
failed for two reasons: An insufficient amount of funds and military personnel, and a
failure of the Haitian government to cooperate with the peacekeeping forces and the UN
state-building goals (Einsiedel and Malone 2006). This line of thinking influenced how
the UN and the international community structured the formation of MINUSTAH
following the uprising in 2004, when Aristide was ousted. When MINUSTAH was
formed in April 2004, it was given more power and more personnel than the previous
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peacekeeping missions. MINUSTAH’s mandate was also more refined and specific than
Multinational Interim Force, one of MINUSTAH’s predecessors, or the other missions.
According to the MINUSTAH website,
MINUSTAH was originally set up to support the Transitional Government in
ensuring a secure and stable environment; to assist in monitoring, restructuring
and reforming the Haitian National Police; to help with comprehensive and
sustainable Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programmes;
to assist with the restoration and maintenance of the rule of law, public safety and
public order in Haiti; to protect United Nations personnel, facilities, installations
and equipment and to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical
violence; to support the constitutional and political processes; to assist in
organizing, monitoring, and carrying out free and fair municipal, parliamentary
and presidential elections; to support the Transitional Government as well as
Haitian human rights institutions and groups in their efforts to promote and
protect human rights; and to monitor and report on the human rights situation in
the country (United Nations MINUSTAH 2011).
MINUSTAH’s mandate, originally conceived to be a short-term mission, has been
renewed since 2004 and was renewed again following the earthquake of 2010.
MINUSTAH has also changed and evolved according to the current political situation in
Haiti (United Nations MINUSTAH 2011). The widening of the goals allowed for both
MINUSTAH and the UN to have a greater level of control over Haitian politics and the
population. MINUSTAH is the main police force in Haiti and is in charge of training the
Haitian National Police.
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The International Response to the 2010 Earthquake in Haiti
On Tuesday January 24, 2010, an earthquake with a magnitude of 7.0 Mw hit Haiti at
approximately 16:53. See map below of the epicenter of the earthquake in Haiti.

(Source U.S. Geological Survey 2010)
As of February 12, 2010 the following statistics had been released: Three million
people were affected by the earthquake; between 217,000 and 230,000 people were dead
and 300,000 injured; 1.5 million people had been left homeless and internally displaced,
about one sixth of the Haitian population (United Nations OCHA 2010)4.
One year later, the Interim Haiti Reconstruction Commission (IHRC) suggests
that one million people still reside in IDP camps across Haiti and less than five percent of
IDPs have access to potable water and only twenty seven percent have access to
4

These are estimates by the UN and Haitian government. The true number of dead, injured and displaced
will never be known because of the inability to take accurate censes directly following the earthquake.
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sanitation. The humanitarian response proved difficult on multiple levels. Not only were
the Haitian government, domestic and international NGOs and other international actors
unprepared for a disaster of this scale, but the earthquake destroyed roads, government
and NGO buildings and killed a large number of people, both Haitians and foreigners
who had previously worked in the public sector. Areas outside of Port Au Prince often
did not receive emergency aid and assistance until days or weeks after the earthquake
because few humanitarian actors could make it out of the capital.
One could spend an entire thesis detailing the international response to Haiti.
Hundreds of people and aid agencies were deployed to respond, and billions of dollars in
aid have been pledged. It would be difficult to describe how each organization
participated in the disaster assistance and recovery, so I will highlight instead how
MINUSTAH, the UN’s World Food Program (WFP), the International Organization for
Migration (IOM) and the United States military responded in the months following the
earthquake. What follows is in no way a monolithic description of how all aid
organizations and international governments responded.
MINUSTAH, as discussed earlier, was deployed in response to the 2004 coup
d’état that overthrew the Aristide government. Due to political instability, the mandate of
MINUSTAH has been renewed annually. After the 2010 earthquake, the mandate was
again renewed and additional troops were sent (United Nations MINUSTAH 2011).
MINUSTAH is mandated to ensure political stability and is to “support of the
Transitional Government, to ensure a secure and stable environment within which the
constitutional and political process in Haiti can take place” (United Nations Resolution
1542). Major Bruce Sand, a member of MINUSTAH from Canada wrote, “MINUSTAH
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is the world’s effort to coach Haiti back onto the path of national stability and heading
toward peace and prosperity” (National Defense and Canadian Forces 2010). In a speech
after the passage of the resolution to send more troops to Haiti following the earthquake,
Secretary-General of the United Nations Ban Ki-moon argued, “We must do all we can to
get these extra forces on the ground as soon as possible so that they can help maintain
order and deliver humanitarian assistance.” (United Nations Press Release 2010)
MINUSTAH’s main role in the response to the earthquake has been to “maintain order”
by securitizing the distribution of aid. It has been operating as a national policing force
for the protection of aid workers and securitizing the distribution centers and the
distribution process to safeguard against rioting and violence (United Nations
MINUSTAH press release 2010).
The United Nations World Food Programme (WFP) was also already operating
in Haiti prior to January 2010, but dramatically scaled up its response in the first week
after the earthquake. Within 24 hours, WFP was distributing emergency food packets.
According to its website, WFP distributed food to over four million displaced Haitians
(Haiti -World Food Program 2010). WFP set up at least 50 distribution centers in Port Au
Prince and surrounding areas (WFP 2010). After the “emergency” stage was completed,
the organization slowly switched to the “recovery” stage, in which they ended blanket
(untargeted) mass distributions and began distributing aid to “vulnerable groups” (WFP
Haiti: One Year Later report 2011). In the recovery stage, WFP is focusing its
distributions on school children, the elderly, the disabled, pregnant women and single
mothers. In the “Haiti: One Year After” report, the organization states that it is now
attempting to coordinate more with the Haitian government to purchase foods grown
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locally, and to streamline their services with the needs of the government. Additionally,
the organization details its coordination with other humanitarian organizations, for
example CARE, World Vision, and the Red Cross Red Crescent societies, as well as
MINUSTAH and the United States army which provided security for the organization
during some of the food distributions (WFP Haiti: One Year Later report 2011).
The International Organization of Migration (IOM) was also operational in
Haiti prior to the earthquake, but its focus was largely on monitoring international
migration patterns. After the earthquake, it began focusing on the internally displaced
populations as well. The IOM fact sheet states that,
Under the overall leadership of the Government of Haiti, IOM is working closely
with many other humanitarian and development organizations, including the UN
country team, to ensure safe living locations and adequate shelter, as well as
tracking population movements and informing on conditions at displacement sites
(IOM Haiti Fact Sheet 2010).
IOM is in charge of the Camp Manager Cluster (CCIM), which trains and coordinates
camp managers. It is also active in the Health, Shelter, and Sanitation clusters. Its main
role in the response has been to help NGOs coordinate and collaborate, and to conduct
data collection and monitor IDP campsites. The IOM is the largest international
organization operating in Haiti, employing over four hundred people (IOM Haiti 2011).
The United States military, under the Operation Unified Response, deployed
22,000 forces in the months following the earthquake. Most of the military units were
aboard ships in the waters surrounding Haiti, but some seven thousand were based on
land (SOUTHCOM 2010). The units are under the control of Southern Command, or
SOUTHCOM, which is in charge of the United States military operations in South
America and the Caribbean. The military was deployed the day after the earthquake hit.
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The Department of Defense describes the mission as one intended “to save lives and
provide security, when necessary, to support the delivery of water, food and medical
care” (Department of Defense 2010). According to United States Marines interviewed in
the summer of 2010, the United States military was unable to directly give aid to
Haitians, but instead acted to support international humanitarian organizations. One
serviceman I spoke to suggested that the military had stopped giving direct aid so that the
United States military would not give the wrong impression about the role of the military.
In the same vein a Time magazine article presented the mission as follows:
The “Marines are definitely warriors first,” Captain Clark Carpenter said Friday
as his unit prepared to ship out to Haiti from North Carolina. “But we are equally
as compassionate when we need to be, and this is a role that we like to show — a
compassionate warrior that can reach out that helping hand to those who need it”
(Time Magazine 2010).
Why did the United States military and the UN peacekeeping troops play such an
enormous role in the distribution of aid following the earthquake? I recognize the
dominant arguments that only a military operation (the United States military and the
already active peacekeeping mission in Haiti) has the logistical training and access to
resources to adequately respond, but ultimately I believe there is a more complicated
answer, which is tied to how humanitarianism is changing in response to a global
pressures and agendas. As societies become increasingly concerned with issues of
security, the mechanisms and functions of humanitarianism are changing to respond. An
analysis of the discourses of the media, humanitarian organizations, governments, the
UN, peacekeeping troops and the United States military illuminates a shift toward
humanitarianism operating as a mechanism of security. This chapter has illustrated how
humanitarianism has evolved in light of the changing relationships between
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humanitarianism and other discourses (developmentalism, human rights etc.) as well as
the changing representations of humanitarianism, and humanitarian organizations and the
internally displaced populations they are serving.
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Chapter Two: Humanitarianism as a Mechanism of Security
The previous chapter first explored changes and evolutions in understandings of
humanitarianism as a form of intervention. In focusing on interventions in Haiti, the
chapter examined not only how our perceptions of humanitarianism have changed
historically, but also how humanitarianism can be understood as a means of intervention
and how it fits among other forms of interventions in Haiti. This chapter will focus on
humanitarianism as a mechanism of governmentality, and a reflection of global politics
and sovereignty. As politicians, states and international organizations become
increasingly concerned with issues of security, how does the humanitarian industry
reflect these changes? In this chapter I argue that the humanitarian industry, operating as
a mechanism of power, is currently grounded in discourses of security. Humanitarianism
is intricately tied to the “international community” because of the distribution of power in
society and the manner in which sovereignty has evolved due to global governance and
globalization. The international community, represented by nation-states that desire to
control and monitor populations is increasingly focusing on the construction and
elimination of “security threats.” Humanitarianism is one mechanism that the
international community deploys to create more secure communities, nations, and
populations. This chapter will first outline how humanitarianism is a mechanism of
governance and how this reflects the relationships between the international community,
humanitarian organizations and the displaced populations they are serving. The chapter
will then move toward understanding humanitarianism as means of securing and
monitoring populations. With a focus on Haiti’s internally displaced population camps as
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sites where the mechanisms of security are performed, the chapter will explore how
humanitarianism as intervention is operating as a mechanism of security.
Humanitarianism as a Mechanism of Governance
Foucault (2007) begins his discussion about governmentality and power by defining
power “in terms of the set of mechanisms and procedures that have a role or function and
theme”(16). Humanitarianism is operating as a mechanism of governance because of the
ways in which power is distributed, the organization and structure of humanitarian
organizations, and humanitarian organizations’ relationship with the international
community. Foucault argues, “mechanisms of power are an intrinsic part of all relations
and, in a circular way, are both their effect and cause” (2007:17). Thus cannot examine
humanitarianism as a mechanism of governance without conceptualizing it first as a
mechanism of power.
In the second section of this chapter I will discuss humanitarianism and
sovereignty, but in this section I will outline how humanitarianism is a mechanism of
power and of governance. Foucault explores power as the relations and procedures
“whose role is to establish, maintain, and transform mechanisms of power, are not “selfgenerating” or “self- subsistent”; they are not founded on themselves. Power is not
founded on itself or generated by itself” (2007: 17). Humanitarianism is one of the
mechanisms through which power is exercised.
Although the intentionality and the stated aims and goals of humanitarian
organizations might not suggest a direct tie with the political goals of the international
community, there are a number of direct correlations between the two. To understand
humanitarian organizations as mechanisms of governance, I will examine four aspects
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that speak to not only their institutionalization and industrialization but also their
connections to the international community.
Working from a broad, institutional level, humanitarian organizations are
bureaucratized and are institutionally organized in much the same way corporations,
government agencies, and the health care industry are organized. As organizations
attempt to become more efficient and streamline services, they become increasingly
bureaucratized. Humanitarian organizations, like corporations or government agencies,
are organized in a top down manner. There is generally a CEO, or Executive Director at
the top and power is distributed in a tiered manner down to the field workers. Each tier
receives their orders from the tier above and is expected to not only obey those orders,
but also enforce them on the tiers below. This method is considered to be the most
efficient means of organization, partly because of how it distributes power. Each person
has a certain amount of power, but also a certain amount of powerlessness, in that they
have little control or means of opposing directives. Humanitarian workers even those
who work in an office, are then, because of the institutional, bureaucratic structure of
humanitarian organizations both explicitly enforced by and enforcing power.
This power distribution leads to humanitarian organizations becoming
mechanisms of governance especially when one considers the funding and the directives
that are enforced by funders. Nonprofit organizations, because of the manner in which
they are structured and their almost constant battle for funds are dependent on funders.
Funders are offered control in the operation of the organizations. This becomes
problematic when the funding for many of the large scale humanitarian organizations,
such UNHCR or the Red Cross, depends largely on governments, and more specifically,

53

the American government. This trend is on the rise, as Michael Barnett (2005) and
Joanna Macrae (2001) discuss. Barnett, in Humanitarianism Transformed writes,
“Although private contributions increased, they paled in comparison to official
[government] assistance… A few donors were responsible for much of this increase, and
they also now comprise an oligopoly. The United States is the lead donor by a factor of
three” (Barnett 2005: 727). Funders are able to dictate policy changes and operational
practices by either increasing or cutting funding. If the funder, be it a private individual, a
corporation, or the United States government, does not agree with how a humanitarian
organization is being run, they are able to tell the organization. If the contributions are
large enough, the organization is likely to adjust their policies and programs. When
power is distributed in a top down, bureaucratic way, it is easy to see how funders can
affect the operations of humanitarian organizations, and in turn how the latter have
limited space protesting or opposing the directives their funders.
Funding for the U.N. comes from individual member states’ dues and funding
appeals for specific donations. However, the amount of dues corresponds to the size of
GDP (United Nations 2010). Due to the vast economic inequalities between member
states, the top 15 (out of 192) contributors give eighty four percent of the regular budget
and eighty nine percent of the peacekeeping budget (United Nations 2010). The top five
contributors are the United States, the United Kingdom, France, China and the Russian
Federation and they contribute close to forty percent of the budget. The five permanent
members of the U.N. Security council, not surprisingly, are the United States, the United
Kingdom, France, China and the Russian Federation.
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According to the International Committee of Red Cross 2007 annual report, ICRC
“is funded by contributions from the States party to the Geneva Conventions
(governments); national Red Cross and Red Crescent societies; supranational
organizations (such as the European Commission); and public and private sources. All
funding is voluntary” (ICRC Annual Report 2007). The International Committee of Red
Cross is also primarily funded by the United States and Western, European countries
(ICRC Annual Report 2007).
Humanitarian organizations are mechanism of governance because of the nature
and purpose of their work. Humanitarian organizations, whose funding, staff and
directives are coming largely from the “developed” world and operating in the
“developing” world, are offering humanitarian assistance to those countries which are
deemed underdeveloped or in need of additional support. This assistance, despite its best
intentions, is based on certain assumptions that the organizations, the people who work
for them, and their funders have about who needs assistance, who is qualified to give it,
and what assistance looks like. These assumptions are generally based on dominant
narratives and perceptions about development and human rights, which rely on
Enlightenment ideals of a modernization and the linear path to achieving development
(Mohanty 2003, Barker 2000, Harding 2000). The modernization ideology is also based
on dichotomies, which function to create distinct spheres that stand in opposition to each
other. This allows for the differentiation between two things in stark contrast, which in
turn simplifies issues and denies socio-historical and economic factors by reducing issues
to “traditional versus modern,” “male versus female,” “black versus white,” or “North
versus South.” Humanitarian assistance is, therefore, a mechanism of governance that
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reflects and propagates notions of development and human rights across the globe.
Humanitarian organizations are mechanisms of governance that, through a variety of
methods, enforce and reinforce existing power structures and relationships.
The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) recently requested $103.3
million for the UNDP of Haiti. The money, as discussed earlier, comes from the
international community. Although the U.N. acknowledges, “only Haitians can rebuild
Haiti again” (UNDP 2010: 2) they will still have a large part in the coordination of that
rebuilding. As the UNDP itself states,
The Haitian authorities are determined to build back a “new Haiti,” a Haiti
transformed by seizing this historic moment and entering into a new partnership
with the international community. The UN is committed to placing itself at the
centre of this new partnership, which should rest on the principles of Haitian
leadership and mutual accountability for results (UNDP 2010: 3 emphasis added).
Much of the funding is going towards a cash-for-work program, which creates jobs for
displaced Haitians. The UNDP, and by proxy its funders, the “international community,”
are contributing greatly to the restructuring of the Haitian government and economy. The
United States Agency for International Development (USAID) states as its goal
developing Haiti economically, politically, and socially. Its goals include helping Haiti
reduce internal conflict and provide the basis to rebuild by addressing key sources
of stress and conflict in social, economic and political spheres, notably through
creating employment and rebuilding assets for sustainable livelihoods (economic),
increasing access to primary health services and primary education (social), and
fostering improved rule of law and responsive governance (political) (USAID
Strategic Plan 2010).
USAID and the United States government are operating under the assumption that they
hold the key to improving the situation in Haiti. The model USAID employs in Haiti is
the same model it uses in all “fragile states” and incorporates the ideals of economic
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freedom, the rule of law, and democratically organized government. USAID has had the
same goal of “developing Haiti” since its inception in the 1960s (USAID 2010).
Relationships of power are further evidenced in the increasing utilization of
securitization discourses. Humanitarian organizations are operating as mechanisms of
security through indirect means by controlling the distribution of food, water, and shelter.
This level of control allows humanitarian organizations to practice biopower from at an
international level. Humanitarian organizations, which are dependent on the whims of the
international community, are able to control the most basic of human functions and
therefore are able to monitor, supervise and control people at the level of the population.
The discourses of securitization are also increasingly evident in more direct ways,
through the militarization of humanitarianism and humanitarian intervention. Aid has
become tied to issues of “security” in a number of ways. Two main examples are the use
of humanitarianism to justify military intervention and the use of security and military
forces and technologies to distribute aid. I will address these issues in greater detail later.
Finally, on the local level, humanitarianism is a mechanism of governance and is
practicing power in its everyday, on the ground, interactions. The unequal power
distribution between aid workers and recipients of aid is discussed in Barbara HarrellBond’s seminal article, “Can Humanitarian Work with Refugees be Humane?” (2002).
Harrell-Bond suggests that the very nature of giving and receiving aid is disempowering
for refugees,
There are insufficient resources to meet needs, with the power to decide their
allocation placed in the hands of humanitarian workers who have no
responsibility to consider the views of those for whom they are intended. As a
consequence, both humanitarian workers and refugees are “trapped” in
asymmetrical relationships in a structure in which accountability is skewed in the
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direction of the donors who pay for the assistance rather than the refugees (2002:
53).
Though Harrell-Bond never mentions Foucault, this is clearly an example of how power
is distributed at all levels of society and is exercised through different relationships.
Humanitarian aid workers, because of their position as a “helper” as Harrell-Bond
suggests, are inherently in a relative position of power over the refugees. This power can
often be detrimental to both refugees and the helpers themselves. The power exercised by
aid workers is relative in relation to funders in that they do not have the position or
authority to make decisions about how organizations are run.
After the 2010 earthquake in Haiti, well-meaning aid workers descended on the
country. Hundreds of organizations sent people to respond to the disaster. It was believed
that Haiti alone would be unable to respond adequately, because of as discussed in the
previous chapter, Haiti has long been represented as a failed or fragile state and its history
of intervention and colonialism have helped create discourses about the inabilities and
underdevelopment of the Haitian state. Aid workers came from around the world, with a
variety of skills and vocations. Aid workers, with their ability to save or take lives by
controlling the distribution of shelter, food, water, or medical treatment of the Haitian
population who were displaced and affected by the earthquake. One volunteer from the
organization World Vision described a trip to distribute tents and building materials on
her blog, “Eileen’s Blog.” She and a veteran aid worker who has worked all over the
world describe waking up one morning at 5:00 am to visit a camp and distribute tents:
“The plan is to go early and make sure that only those who live in the camp get the help
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they need,” wrote Eileen. Not only do aid workers have a monopoly on the distribution of
aid (in this case tents) but they can, or must, determine who deserves and who does not.
At a shelter cluster meeting in Port Au Prince I heard a presentation from the
representatives of Humanitarianism Accountability Partnership (HAP). HAP was
conducting camp committee assessments to evaluate how camp committees shared
information, and managed camp participation and complaint mechanisms. According to
the representatives there were three levels of accountability: HAP, Interagency (the
organizations managing the camps) and the camp committees. Their purpose was to
assess participation and level of local ownership of the camp and its elected committees.
HAP and the NGO camp managers were involved in restructuring the camp committees
to change the power structures and encourage democratic participation. At one point in
the presentation the speaker stated that part of HAP’s role in the shelter cluster was to
“assess the camp committees to decide how much power to give them.” The presentation
reveals the role and level of control of organizations like HAP and the UN have in the
IDP camps: the humanitarian organizations have the ability to give power to Haitians if
they behave in the way preferred by the international organizations.
Even though displaced Haitians have been placed in positions of relative
powerlessness, they were still instances in which Haitians took matters into their own
hands. Although humanitarian organizations claim to have the ability to give power, or to
empower Haitians, in reality each day Haitians are empowering themselves. For example,
when humanitarian organizations or the Haitian government fail to deliver essential
services, or neglect particular camps because of their location or size, it is up to the
community to deliver the services themselves. At one camp I visited, an international
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humanitarian organization had ceased trash collection. Most sanitation operations are
controlled by humanitarian organizations, so it was difficult for this camp to find an
affordable option for garbage disposal. When the trash started to pile up, and no
organization would agree to help, the camp decided to borrow pick-up trucks and used
shovels to take the trash out. Even though international organizations control many of the
essential service delivery sectors, when they fail to do so, members of the camps are
forced to come up with their own solutions. Each camp I visited had tents devoted to the
different services a community might need. From food stores to barber shops, the camps
created their own survival mechanisms.
Humanitarianism and Sovereignty
The international community responds to humanitarian emergencies and crises by
deploying the humanitarian industry. What the response entails, who receives it, who
sends it, and the amount of aid are intimately linked to the political whims, needs, and
decisions of the international community. That the international community can decide to
either send troops or food aid to an area affected by a crisis reveals the complicated
nature of sovereignty and how nation-states relate to each other. The issue of sovereignty
and intervention is hotly debated, and the two are largely seen as in conflict with each
other. Carola Weil describes the debate as being between state rights and individual
rights: “The norms of sovereignty and nonintervention essentially protect borders.
Human rights norms, by contrast, aim to protect individuals” (2001: 83). Most argue that
the nation-state’s rights are being subsumed by the international community’s ability to
intervene either militarily or otherwise in the name of human rights. However, the nationstate and the international human rights regime are intertwined and related. A globalized
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human rights regime is not destroying the geographically rooted nation-state system of
equally sovereign states.
The Westphalian treaty marks the historically acknowledged beginning of the
state and was created to limit international intervention in European states. Sovereignty
was conceptualized as being based around the state and as geographically rooted within
the state’s borders. The state has the ability to levy taxes and to protect its land and its
people with the end goal of defending and protecting the state and its interests because
the state and the people are often conceived to be one and the same. Therefore, the state
has sovereignty within its own borders. However, and this has been true since the
inception of the state system, if the state feels its interests are being threatened, it is
within its jurisdiction and its right as a state to intervene. Therefore, if a state feels it is
within its economic interest to conduct international trade, or engage militarily with
another state, it is able to justify that interaction. Accordingly, sovereignty and the
relationships between states change when states engage in any kind of global interactions.
These global interactions lead to the construction of varying layers and levels of
sovereignty. Sovereignty, according to Stephen Krasner, can be conceptualized in four
different ways:
Interdependence sovereignty refers to the ability of a government to regulate the
movement of goods, capital, people, and ideas across its borders. Domestic
sovereignty refers both to the structure of authority within a state and to the state’s
effectiveness or control. International legal sovereignty refers to whether a state is
recognized by other states, the basic rule being that only juridically independent
territorial entities are accorded recognition. Westphalian sovereignty, which
actually has almost nothing to do with the Peace of Westphalia, refers to the
autonomy of domestic authority structures—that is, the absence of authoritative
external influences. A political entity can be formally independent but de facto
deeply penetrated. A state might claim to be the only legitimate enforcer of rules
within its own territory, but the rules it enforces might not be of its own making
(2001: 2).
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The multiple ways in which sovereignty manifests itself reveals the social construction of
sovereignty, nation-states and borders. Stuart Elden (2006) writes that absolute
sovereignty is a “chimera and that international agreements of many kinds have created a
system in which sovereignty is necessarily pooled, interdependent and limited. However,
even the United Nations requires the ‘necessary fiction’ of sovereignty as a means of
structuring international relations” (14). Absolute state sovereignty is not being replaced
by an international human rights regime; instead sovereignty manifests itself differently
depending on the needs and decisions of the international community at large.
The ability, or the decision, to intervene on an international level is rooted deeply
in the construction of varying understandings of sovereignty. According the Carl Schmitt
(1922), this ability to decide on the exception is what defines sovereignty. Sovereign is he
“who decides in a situation of conflict what constitutes the public interests or interest of
the state, public safety and order” (Schmitt 1922: 6). Therefore, the ability to decide on
when intervention is required is rooted in sovereignty. The distribution of humanitarian
aid or food aid, regardless of whether it involves the deployment of troops is still a form
of intervention. The ability to decide to give aid, and who is deserving of it reflects a
global sovereignty. Even if humanitarian intervention is based solely on the idea of
“goodwill to fellow man” (Parekh 1997: 50), the ability to decide on the exception, in
other words, the decision to intervene, rests on the shoulders of the sovereign because the
sovereignty of another state is circumvented. Exceptional situations, a situation in which
one state is deemed responsible or required to intervene in the affairs of another state are
ultimately decided by the sovereign. The international community does not always
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intervene when there are human rights abuses, natural disasters, famines, or
underdevelopment in other states and if they do intervene, the type of intervention
depends on the decisions of the sovereign.
Humanitarianism operates as a mechanism of governance and just as power
circulates among individuals and institutions on a domestic level, so too does it circulate
among and between nation-states. The humanitarian industry is one apparatus and
discourse that is deployed to maintain and reproduce existing power structures.
Therefore, the arguments that national sovereignty is declining because of the United
Nations or the international human rights regime do not address the global power
structures nor the shifting and constantly changing conceptions and realities of
sovereignty. Anne Caldwell, drawing on Giorgio Agamben, uses the term “biosovereignty” to address the changing faces of sovereignty:
The increasing difficulty of localizing sovereignty in its former areas is one
reason sovereignty is often seen as declining. Agamben’s account of sovereignty
as a space of indeterminacy is an important counter to those assumptions. The
concept of bio-sovereignty lets us recognize the presence of sovereignty where
older concepts built around the nation-state find only its disappearance. Insofar as
sovereignty is a general power of regulating boundaries, whose ground is homo
sacer, it has no necessary tie to particular territories of peoples. The impossibility
of locating sovereignty in a precise territory or group does not signal a collapse of
sovereignty but its transformation. (2004: 9).
The ability of some states to dictate and control international institutions of governance is
evident, and as those institutions grow to fit the demands of a globalized world,
sovereignty continues to be transformed. As Jacques Derrida (2005) writes, “to confer
sense or meaning on sovereignty, to justify it, to find a reason for it, is already a
compromise in its deciding exceptionality” (101). Attempts at classifying different modes
and types sovereignty as Krasner does is useful to help conceptualize how sovereignty is
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changing and transforming, but it is also reveals the impossibility of specifically locating
it within a set of laws or international norms.
Foucault’s concepts of power and knowledge are also important to understanding
global sovereignty. Discourses that are dominant and knowledges that are accepted
reflect power relations and the exercise of power. In other words, power is exercised
through the construction of subjects and objects and the knowledge about them.
Discourse and knowledge perpetuate the current distribution of power and as well as the
production of discourses and policies that posit certain countries as having the knowledge
and understanding of what it takes to become developed and the proper way of ensuring
the protection of human rights. Jens Bartleson (1995) in Genealogy of Sovereignty
explores this relationship between global sovereignty, power, and knowledge. The
dominant discourses from the human rights regime and developmentalism create a cycle
of mutual perpetuation between sovereignty and knowledge.
The relationship between power and knowledge is also evidenced in the
construction of identities. The ability of some nation-states to decide on what constitutes
a valid reason for intervention, humanitarian or otherwise, is dependent on unequal power
distributions. The justification for intervention, especially humanitarian intervention, is
generally based on constructions of states as being either real, quasi or failed, which itself
is often linked to the binaries of developed and developing. Roxanne Doty, in her book
Imperial Encounters (1996), addresses this unequal distribution of power, and the ability
of one state or entity to construct realities and discourses about the other failed or quasi or
developing state. She suggests that Northern countries created labels and identities that
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not only enforce, but also allow and perpetuate their intervention in Southern countries.
Discussing an MIT study on foreign aid, Doty argues that,
The presumption was that some subjects were the definers, delimiters, and
boundary setters of important practices and ideas such as participation and
democracy and that others not capable themselves of making such definitions,
would have these things bestowed upon them and would be permitted to enjoy
them only under the circumstances deemed suitable by the United States (1996:
139).
In the final chapter I will explore in greater detail how humanitarianism helps to construct
the identities and meanings of displaced populations, Haitians, and failed states.
Humanitarianism as a Mechanism of Security
In the last few decades, many academics, policy makers, activists and advocates have
discussed the increasing securitization of societies. The securitization of migration is one
aspect that is hotly debated, but securitization is related not just to the closing down of
borders, or the proliferation in technologies of security but also reflects a changing
discourse through which nation-states and the citizen are being constructed. Foucault
describes security as a mechanism to maintain and control at the level of the population.
(Foucault 2007). The discourses of security are increasingly being deployed and power is
functioning through the mechanisms of security. Foucault (2007) defines the relationship
between governmentality and security apparatuses as:
The ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, the
calculations and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific albeit complex
form of power, which has as its target population, as its principal form of
knowledge political economy, and as its essential technical means apparatuses of
security. The tendency which over a long period and throughout the West has
steadily led towards the pre-eminence over all other forms (sovereignty, discipline
etc.) of this type of power which may be termed government, resulting on one
hand, in the formation of a whole series of specific governmental apparatuses,
and, on the other, in the development of a whole complex of saviors (102).
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Humanitarianism operating as a mechanism of security and governmentality can be
understood by at least two related and interdependent processes. The first process is what
Bigo (2002) describes as the “governmentality of unease,” which describes how the
discourses of securitization are legitimized through various methods. This leads to (and is
enforced by) the second process, which is biopower and the control and maintenance of
internally displaced populations receiving humanitarian assistance at the level of the
population. One fundamental aspect of this move to securitization is the framing of
threats. Threats are constructed by the discourses and practices of security and security
mechanisms are enacted to control and manage the threats.
Humanitarianism, an institution of global governance, is operating as a
mechanism of securitization. Increasingly, humanitarian crises are being framed as
threats to security and stability; the humanitarian industry is one global reaction to this.
The 1990s saw an increase in the level of military involvement in humanitarian crises
(Barnett 2005, Macrae 2001), from peacekeeping troops in Kosovo (1998) to the military
occupation in Somalia (1992). The lines between military action and humanitarianism
have become blurred and military action is justified in the name of human rights and
peace. The use of the military in humanitarian crises reflects a shift in what humanitarian
action looks like and means. When it comes to interventions, the framing of displaced
persons as security threats justifies the use of military forces and other mechanisms of
control over the displaced populations.
Additionally, humanitarian crises spark increased fears of immigration, in the case
of the earthquake in Haiti to the United States and Canada. This fear coincides with the
securitization of migration, in which immigrants are constructed as a threat to the order
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and stability of the nation-state. Bigo (2002) discusses the securitization of immigration
as not only the result of racism and the rise of the far right in the political arena, but as
also reflective of how we understand citizenship, the nation, and belonging:
Securitization of the immigrant as a risk is based on our conception of the state as
a body or container for the polity. It is anchored in the fears of politicians about
losing their symbolic control over the territorial boundaries. It is structured by the
habitus of the security professionals and their new interests not only in the
foreigner but in the “immigrant.” These interests correlated with the globalization
of technologies of surveillance and control going beyond the national borders. It
is based, finally, on the “unease” that some citizens who feel discarded suffer
because they cannot cope with the uncertainty of everyday life (2002: 3).
Huysman (2006) discusses the objective and subjective nature of security threats and
insecurity and highlights the role politics and economics have in shaping the policies and
procedures that further securitization. The level of attention security threats receive
depends on a hierarchy of threats constructed by policy makers, the media and the public.
One mechanism for dealing with these threats, especially persons who are displaced
internally, is through humanitarianism and the humanitarian industry.
The treatment of displaced persons highlights the subjective nature of the framing
and creating of security threats. Aradau (2004) describes how trafficked sex workers are
both victims in need of aid and security threats at the same time. The coupling of
humanitarian aid and security mechanisms is what Aradau calls the “politics of pity”
merging with the “politics of risk.” In a sense, the very act of being at risk causes a
population to be a risk. This is not a new process, but how the international community,
governments and institutions deal with these risky populations is increasingly securitized.
Aradau writes, “to expose the perverse relation between the humanitarian and security
articulations, I shall consider them as governmental processes: practical interventions
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with the purpose of managing the phenomenon of trafficking” (2004: 253). The same can
be said for international humanitarian aid. The humanitarian industry is a practical means
of managing populations that have been displaced. The willingness of the international
community to respond to disasters is not solely the result of displaced populations being
framed as security threats, it also reflects the “politics of pity,” which rely on emotional
appeals to help people in need. However, the “symptomatic subversion of pity by risk”
(Aradau 2004: 255) is affecting humanitarian policies and programs.
Doty, as addressed earlier, discusses the politics of representation and how
labeling and defining a population as the “other” creates a subjective reality to rely on
when creating policies and programs. These identities have long been in place. Though
they change, a fundamental divide in identity construction between the North and the
South remains. This construction allows for intervention and
these representational strategies are intensified in times of crisis when naturalized
identities and the existing order are at risk of being called into question. This is
consistent with the notion of hegemonizing practices intensifying during times of
organic crisis when the North was confronted with the potential loss of control
and authority (Doty 1996: 12).
The times of crisis can be understood as environmental crises such as earthquakes,
hurricanes, or droughts, or it can be tied to war, conflict and the failed state. In either
case, as Huysman (2006) and Malmvig (2006) discuss, the decision to intervene is based
on a series of factors in which risks are calculated and ranked.
Using humanitarianism as a mechanism of security relies on the framing of
displaced persons as security threats. By constructing bodies or nations or communities
as potential threats to stability and security, it allows, enables and justifies the use of
humanitarianism. If populations are framed as violent and dangerous, it is necessary for
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aid distribution to protect the safety of those involved. The case of the response to the
Haiti earthquake highlights the level of control the international community has over
displaced Haitians. The media and the humanitarian aid organizations represent Haitians,
particularly Haitian men, as risks and threats. It is considered common knowledge that
Haiti is a failed, fragile and/or insecure state, and that the men are volatile and dangerous.
This was true even before the earthquake. As discussed in chapter one, the United States
has sent military operations to Haiti since the early 1900s and since the coup d’état in
2004, the UN has maintained a peace keeping force in Haiti (MINUSTAH). Thus the
construction of Haitian bodies as security threats has existed for years, but the
international response to the earthquake of 2010 reveals how the securitization discourses
and mechanisms have affected the distribution of aid. This is most readily seen in the
military response to the humanitarian disaster, but is also evidenced in the use of
humanitarian organization’s control over the Haitian population. The two are not
unrelated and they reveal a trend towards securing, monitoring and controlling
threatening populations.
The United States military sent sixteen thousand troops (BBC News 2010) and the
UN deployed seven thousand troops to respond to the Haiti earthquake (Beaumont and
Tran 2010). The military troops were sent for at least two reasons: The first was to
effectively and efficiently distribute aid. The advanced technologies of the military,
particularly the American military, were seen as better able to distribute aid than the
humanitarian organizations on the ground. The second reason was security. Admiral
Mike Mullen, the chairman of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, argued that, "In
addition, the marines assigned to 24 MEU will be able to provide an additional force
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capable of providing a secure environment for the ongoing relief efforts ashore in Haiti"
(BBC News 2010). The United States military was one of the main distributors of aid and
assisted most major humanitarian organizations, including World Health Organization,
by creating a “secure environment” during the distribution of aid. The military presence
was expected to reduce rioting and looting. Also, according to an Associated Press
article, “Each American dollar roughly breaks down like this: 42 cents for disaster
assistance, 33 cents for United States military aid, nine cents for food, nine cents to
transport the food, five cents for paying Haitian survivors for recovery efforts, just less
than one cent to the Haitian government, and about half a cent to the Dominican
Republic” (Fisch 2010). The distribution of aid money reveals that the second highest
amount goes to security.
International organizations and non-Haitian aid workers have the majority of the
control in the distribution of aid. The earthquake in Haiti devastated the country’s capital
and as such has greatly affected the economy and the ability of the country to produce
and distribute food and water. The Haitian people needed assistance and will continue to
need assistance in the coming months to survive. What is problematic, however, is the
level of control the international community (by way of humanitarian organizations) have
on the bodies of the Haitian people. The international community now controls not only
the eating schedules of displaced Haitians, but also which Haitians receive food aid. It
controls where they sleep and their access to health care. The camps are policed and
securitized on a twenty-four-hour basis and they are under strict surveillance.
The media coverage of the humanitarian industry in Haiti following the
earthquake highlights the level of control the international community has over the lives
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and bodies of Haitians. One Al Jazeera headline reads, “The World Food Programme
(WFP) has temporarily halted food aid to about 10,000 survivors of Haiti’s earthquake
after some people tried to use fake coupons to secure rations” (2010). The WFP, in an
attempt to punish a few Haitians who were cheating the system, is able to withhold food
from tens of thousands of people, many of whom were obeying the rules dictated by the
organization. The humanitarian aid workers are able to decide who is able to eat and who
is not and the humanitarian organizations now wield much more power than the Haitian
government, which is perceived as being largely ineffective at distributing aid. However,
as is evidenced in how American aid has been distributed, the Haitian government, which
was crippled by the earthquake, received little to no humanitarian assistance. In a New
York Times article about the coupon system, Haitians who had not received food aid
were described as “desperate, hungry and still not satisfied, they said they were looking
for the white men in control of food distribution. They needed coupons. They needed to
eat” (New York Times 2010)
“Aid workers helped Romaine Vincent Donal, 44, load her belongings in
wheelbarrows... She said she couldn’t wait to leave, though she didn’t know where she
was going” (Mozingo 2010) reads an article from the Los Angeles Times on 11 April
2010. With hurricane season approaching, fears of flooding in makeshift camps prompted
many to be relocated. The international community and aid workers had complete control
of where the camps were to be relocated and as the quote suggests, Haitians not only had
no part in the decisions to relocate, but were often unaware of their destination or the
location of the new camps.
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Haitian IDP camps as security sites
International organizations, operating as mechanisms of governmentality, thus represent
the importance of security in the distribution of aid and the management of IDP camps.
Valerie Kaussen, deploying Agamben’s concept of the state of exception, details how the
Haitian IDP camp reveals a move toward “the camp” as a site of exception:
What all these spaces share is the suspension of national, territorial law and its
replacement by police power. Those who reside in these legal dead zones are no
longer “citizens”; they live in a state of exception to the law of the land and—
“exceptions” that are becoming more and more the rule. Haiti’s IDP camps are
indeed “states of exception” that risk becoming permanent fixtures in the postearthquake urban landscape in and around Port-au-Prince. While Haitian law
applies as a matter of course to IDP residents who remain Haitian citizens, in
practice, the “rights” of these individuals do not have the full backing of the law
but depend on the goodwill of the organization or person in charge—often with
the support of the Haitian National Police, privately hired gunmen, and the UN
Stabilization Mission in Haiti (2011: 37).
The camps are states of exception in that they exist both within the realm of law, but also
outside of it. There is no universal international governing body to regulate the operations
of the camps and Haitian law seemingly does not apply. The inability of Haitian law to
provide basic human rights for its displaced citizens is not a simple case of the state’s
failure, as will be discussed in the final chapter, but also the power the humanitarian
organizations wield over the Haitian population. This power, as illustrated in the IDP
camp as a “state of exception,” means that humanitarian organizations are in complete
control over the distribution of basic services to the majority of the Haitians displaced by
the 2010 earthquake.
This analysis is critical to understanding Haitian IDP camps and Humanitarian
organizations, but for the remainder of this chapter, I will examine how mechanisms of
security are influencing how the displaced Haitians and IDP camps are dealt with and

72

administered. The issue of security is important to how the international community, the
Haitian state, and the displaced population interact. Miguel De Larrinaga and Marc G.
Doucet in their 2008 article “Sovereign Power and the Biopolitics of Human Security”
articulate the increasing role of security in humanitarian practices:
Human security is instrumental in sovereign power’s ability to delineate the
circumstances in which such a state of exception can be proclaimed. What the
discourse of human security does, whether broad or narrow, is to help define the
exceptional circumstances that require the international community’s intervention,
whether on behalf of humanitarian imperatives as initially conceived or in the
service of maintaining global order as made evident more recently (532).
Therefore, the humanitarian organization, operating as an apparatus of the sovereign
exception, contributes to an increase in the securitization of particular societies. Security
is articulated in two important ways in Haitian IDP camps. The first is the issue of the
physical safety and security of Haitians and aid workers. The second is through the
manner in which the camps are administered. The administration of camps reveals the
ways in which security operates as a means of managing displaced Haitians as a
population.
There is a large international police and military presence on the ground in Haiti.
One cluster meeting I attended discussed the need for the foreign military in Haiti. The
goals of the military were not necessarily to save lives, alleviate suffering, or prepare for
another disaster but instead to “create security” (United Nations Cluster Meeting
presentation 2010). International NGOs hire security consultants and security “concerns”
dominate the conversations at UN cluster meetings. International aid workers have strict
curfews and live in gated communities with security guards. Many voiced concern over
the lack of security during aid distributions. The representative from Samaritan’s Purse I
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spoke with said that security was a major concern during distributions, and that they were
unable to afford their own private security. However, when pressed, he said that in the six
months he had been working in Haiti there had only been one “security event” in which a
group of men attempted to take over a distribution truck and the UN showed up within
five minutes and “neutralized the situation.” According to the security advisor for ICRC,
his number one priority was the protection of aid workers.
I am not arguing that the safety of aid workers is not important, or that an
organization should not be concerned with the health and safety of its employees –
because, as one Red Cross worker said, “who wants to call someone’s parents and tell
them their child has been kidnapped and murdered?” (Interview with Red Cross aid
worker 2010). However I do want to question the focus on security and the practical
implementations of security measures on the displaced populations. How do security
measures ultimately impact displaced Haitians and do they actually ensure their safety?
Or are they instead just another mechanism of security in which populations are framed
as being in need of security and certain lives (those of international aid workers) are
deemed worthy of saving while others are not?
The emphasis on the security of aid workers from the threat of displaced Haitians
reveals the power of representational practices of Haitians as security threats. Although
the physical “security” presence is important for understanding the situation in the IDP
camps, it is also important to understand how security is “managed.” The mechanisms of
security do not attempt to eliminate security threats altogether, but instead attempt to
manage them on the level of the population. Quoting Foucault, Larrinaga and Doucet
explain the management of threat as follows:
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One of the key dynamics in Foucault’s analysis of the relationship between
security and circulation is, therefore, that security’s object remains beyond its
grasp, that the deployment of the technologies of security is done within a context
marked by the impossibility of eliminating insecurity altogether. It is a project, as
Foucault (2007: 20) notes, that is oriented towards a future that is “not exactly
controllable, not precisely measured or measurable”, and good management
“takes into account precisely what might happen” (2008: 524).
One MINUSTAH spokesman at an NGO coordination meeting defined security as safety
and ensuring continuity. He stated, “the security protocol is monitoring.” Creating an
atmosphere of “security” is not about eliminating security threats, which would be
difficult given that Haitian men are often monolithically represented as potential threats,
but instead is a means of managing and controlling threats.
One method of management is data collection. Data collection includes
conducting censes of camp populations and services, map making, and creating labels
and distinctions between populations, for example what constitutes a “camp” versus a
“tent settlement”, or classifying levels of vulnerability. Data collection is, in on one hand,
the result of the bureaucratization of humanitarian organizations. Large bureaucratic
organizations require data for grant reporting, accountability, and as a method of
managing money, employees, and their constituents, in this case, the internally displaced
Haitians.
Data collection, however, is also related to the mechanisms of security that seek
to manage populations. As the MINUSTAH representative stated, security is managing.
One of the major focuses of large humanitarian organizations is surveillance and data
collection. One Haitian camp manager I spoke to complained that to the IOM “data is
more important than camp infrastructure” (interview with camp manager 2010). The UN
and IOM have sophisticated needs assessment surveys, for which it can take up to six
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weeks to gather the information. There are comprehensive and rolling diagnoses to
determine the situations in the camps. Another camp manger said he went to an IOM
Camp Manager training session. He said it lasted four hours and focused almost
exclusively on gathering statistics and on how to “get a grip on the situation” (interview
with camp manager 2010).
Another important aspect of management is the ranking and categorizing of
vulnerabilities. Part of the data collection and surveillance is the determination of who is
most deserving of aid and who is most vulnerable. In the following chapter, I will explore
how Haitian women and children are framed as in need of protection from Haitian males.
What is also interesting is the role “vulnerability” plays in the distribution of aid in the
camps. After blanket distributions of aid ended, organizations began to focus on
distributing aid to “vulnerable populations.” The definition of vulnerability tended to vary
between organizations, but the theme of ranking vulnerabilities remained the same. For
example, Samaritan’s Purse had a form with boxes to check in order to receive food
packets. One had to check at least two boxes to receive the distributions. The checklist
included: displaced people without housing, people with AIDS, disabled, the very young,
the very old, pregnant, or single mothers. The ability to determine vulnerability is a
reflection of the power relations between humanitarian aid workers and the displaced
populations. Additionally, in order to check one of the boxes the Haitian had to provide
documentation proving vulnerability. Not only were Haitians forced to defend their
vulnerability, the documentation was a means of surveillance and a way of categorizing
them into distinguishable groups of vulnerable populations.
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As illustrated before, a contradictory dualism exists in the narratives of
displacement. The decision of who will receive humanitarian aid is not based solely on a
perceived level of vulnerability but also on who most deserves aid. For example, a group
of tents is not an IDP camp unless the IOM and the UN determine it is. The determination
rests on an arbitrarily decided number of tents/people, location of the camp, and if there
is camp management. With the distinction of an official “IDP camp” comes a promise of
aid distributions and also surveillance. The process of deciding which camps are “real”
camps and not just tent settlements is based on a series of surveys and censes.
Additionally, “vulnerability” does not necessarily give a displaced “vulnerable” Haitian
more access to services. Instead, aid workers also have the discretion to determine if a
displaced person deserves the aid. In deciding who receives more permanent housing
(wooden structures with plastic tarps as walls), people who were employed and owned
houses prior to the earthquake are given preferential access.
Security is increasingly framed as the first step to achieving development, human
rights, and good governance. As UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan stated in 2004:
Development and security are inextricably linked. A more secure world is only
possible if poor countries are given a real chance to develop. Extreme poverty and
infectious diseases threaten many people directly, but they also provide a fertile
breeding ground for other threats, including civil conflicts. Even people in rich
countries will be more secure if their Governments help poor countries to defeat
poverty and disease by meeting the Millennium Development Goals. (UN
Secretary-General Kofi Annan, cited in United Nations 2004: vii)
Annan is suggesting two things. The first is that without security, there is no
development, yet ironically, he is also suggesting that poverty (and underdevelopment)
breeds insecurity. This is a theme that I have suggested throughout this thesis, namely the
cyclical and often contradictory ways in which poverty, security and humanitarianism are
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represented within the discourses of politicians, the media and humanitarian
organizations. It speaks first to the intangibility of the causes and sources of insecurity, as
well as to the ultimate inability to fully achieve a secure society or a secure world and
instead demands for an increase in the mechanisms of security.
Humanitarianism is a mechanism that is now being deployed by the international
community in response to the growing influences of discourses of security.
Humanitarianism operating as a mechanism of security is related to the securitization of
migration in that both are responses to global attempts to secure nation-states from real
and perceived threats. It does not matter if the threats will actually endanger the nationstate or its citizens. Humanitarianism as a mechanism of security operates as a means and
justification for controlling and monitoring populations. Humanitarianism, as a
mechanism of global governance is one mechanism that responds to security threats
through means of biopower and control. Agamben in Homo Sacer (1998) writes that,
“humanitarian organizations are in perfect symmetry with state power” and
“humanitarian organizations can only grasp human life in the figure of bare or sacred life
and therefore, despite themselves maintain a secret solidarity with the very powers they
ought to fight” (133). Humanitarianism has always been linked to governments and the
international community and has always been an institutions of power, however, as the
discourses of security become more influential, humanitarianism increasingly operates as
a mechanism of securitization.
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Chapter Three: Representational Practices and the Construction of
Threat
Thus far this thesis has explored the relationships between security, governance,
humanitarianism and intervention in Haiti. Critically analyzing the dominant discourses
about humanitarianism and their relationship to sovereignty and governmentality shows
the construction of Haitians and the Haitian state as being in need of security and security
mechanisms. This chapter explores the importance of representational practices in
relation to humanitarianism and the Haitian population and state. Haitians are
discursively portrayed in a particular way that justifies intervention and securitization.
Understanding the power dynamics and the relationships between power, sovereignty and
the construction of meanings and identities is critical to understanding the humanitarian
response to the 2010 earthquake in Haiti. In this chapter, I hope to challenge the
ahistorical and static representation of Haitians and the Haitian state as needing
humanitarian assistance, as being violent and as posing a security threat. I will also
interrogate the assumption that Haiti is a “failed” or “fragile” state. Instead, I suggest that
these representations are reflections of the relationship between power and knowledge,
humanitarian organizations and states, and the perceptions and construction of the
“other.” The chapter will examine the relationships between humanitarianism, poverty
and security to illuminate the power of discursive representations and identities in the
construction of who needs humanitarian assistance and how to best deliver humanitarian
aid.
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Representational practices of Haitians
“Haiti was a disaster and then the earthquake happened”
Popular saying among humanitarian aid workers in Haiti

The popular representations of Haiti and the Haitian population have long been discussed
in terms of race, culture, religion, poverty, and ideas of backwardness. Using the
language of humanitarianism and intervention has allowed the interveners, be it the UN
or the United States government, to influence how Haiti is portrayed. This portrayal of
Haitians, as being in need of assistance, as being incapable of governing themselves, as
being violent or mob like, has justified the long history of involvement of the
international community in Haiti. The relationship of domination, or intervention, is not
static or linear either, but instead works cyclically: Representational practices construct
meaning and identities, which in turn justify interventions, which are then employed to
further create and justify the constructed identities.
Foucault’s discussions about power can help to conceptualize the role of
discursive power in interventions. Power cannot be understood as being unidirectional, as
something that one owns or possesses, but instead as something one practices.
Understanding power in a relational way helps us to see how humanitarian aid workers,
by utilizing the narratives created by their organizations and the governments that fund
them, are helping to perpetuate the dominant discourses of Haitians and the role of
international interventions in Haiti. During my fieldwork in Haiti, I found that each time I
sat with international aid workers and asked them questions about their work in Haiti,
they were able to repeat almost verbatim the information found on the websites of their
organizations. Most organizations have mission statements and protocols that must be
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followed and predetermined talking points when dealing with reporters and researchers.
Naturally, this is a result of the bureaucratization, institutionalization, and rationalization
of humanitarian organizations, but it also reflects how discourses are produced and
reproduced through the humanitarian organizations.
Drawing on Foucault and those influenced by his discourses, I will to discuss how
the representational practices of Haitians, via humanitarian operations and institutions has
helped, or justified, the framing of displaced Haitians and the Haitian state as security
threats to themselves, to aid workers, and to the international community. This first
section will outline the discursive representational practices of the international
community about Haiti and Haitians and how interventions and humanitarian assistance
aids in the production of meanings and identities. Roxanne Doty, in Imperial Encounters
(1996) outlines the relationship between the North and the South and the discursive
power of identity construction in understanding the presumed natural conflicts between
the “north” and the “south.” She calls these interactions “asymmetrical encounters”:
Arguably one of the most consequential elements present in all of the encounters
between the North and the South has been the practice(s) of representation by the
North of the South. By representation I mean the ways in which the South has
been discursively represented by policy makers, scholars, journalists and others in
the North. This does not refer to the “truth” and “knowledge” that the North has
discovered and accumulated about the South, but rather to the ways in which the
regimes of “truth” and “knowledge” have been produced. The contexts within
which specific encounters have taken place and the issues relevant to these
contexts have been occasions for the proliferation and circulation of various
representations (Doty 1996: 2).
Doty provides an important framework through which to understand not only identity,
but also conceptualizations of culture, race, and poverty and how these issues are
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intertwined with our understanding of identity as something that is not natural, but
discursively produced.
There is a certain perceived naturalness about the relationship between Haiti and
the international community. This perception is historically rooted in the past encounters
of the international community with Haiti as was illustrated in the section about Haiti’s
history of humanitarianism and intervention. Yet, the framing of displaced persons in
Haiti is not unique. Citizens of the global south or migrant populations in the north are all
discursively represented in particular ways that reflect unequal power distributions. I
argue that the construction of dominant discourses about populations ‘in need’ of
intervention allows for humanitarianism to function as a mechanism of governance.
When intervention is framed as humanitarian or as a civilizing mission, or as bringing
democracy or as a state building project, it reveals the ability of the interveners to
construct what intervention is, who is able to intervene, and ultimately who is deserving
of intervention. Those who are doing the intervention define the rules of the game and the
actors involved. The reasons for intervention are presumed to be economic (for example,
development or modernization projects) or militaristic (for example, human rights
intervention, peacekeeping missions) but the social and cultural difference between
communities is taken as a given.
Doty describes the realm of politics as the space “wherein the very identities of
peoples, states, and regions are constructed through representational practices” (1996: 2).
Doty focuses on how Foucault’s work on power can help to understand how political
identities are constructed. When Judith Butler, in Precarious Life, asks, “What makes for
a grievable life?” (2004: 20), she is ultimately asking who counts as a political subject?
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What are the politics of mourning and grieving? Who gets mourned and who gets swept
aside? Claudia Aradau (2004) discusses the politics of risk and the politics of pity when
dealing with trafficked women. The women are represented as something to be both
pitied and feared. However, these two politics are not contradictory but instead form and
influence each other. As soon as the trafficked women are considered deserving of pity
they also represent a risk. Haitians can be described in the same way; their poverty makes
them both pitiful and dangerous. The depoliticization and repoliticization of populations
and people is important in our understanding of how the millions of displaced Haitians
are not only represented in the “realm of politics” but also how humanitarian
organizations respond to their displacement. Agamben in his explorations of the
phenomenon of “bare life” or homo sacer describes this space of politicization and
depoliticization as a sovereign sphere “in which it is permitted to kill without committing
homicide and without celebrating a sacrifice and sacred life- that is life that may be killed
but not sacrificed- is the life that has been captured in this sphere” (1995: 83). Creating
representations of “others” is not an unbiased portrayal of cultural or ethnic difference,
but instead occurs as a means of separating and constructing an identity that can be
contrasted with others and dealt with accordingly.
This chapter will focus on the relationship between poverty, security and
humanitarianism within this realm of politics. Haiti is represented as “the poorest country
in the western hemisphere” and Haitians as being accustomed to violence and
deprivation, poverty and hunger. “Haiti was a disaster and then the earthquake hit” was
an oft-repeated slogan by aid and missionary workers in Haiti. What hope is there for this
small, abject country where women and children eat mud? As a 2008 Guardian article
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states, “Haiti: Mud cakes become staple diet as cost of food soars beyond a family’s
reach”? The lives of Haitians are less grievable not just because of racism or imperialism,
but also because of their poverty and the extremity of their situation. Haitians represent
the limits of the possibilities of human suffering; the majority of the population was
impoverished, hungry and abused even before the earthquake hit and their state has
“failed.” Dominant discourses on Haiti portray it “as a place where the ordinary
constraints of human society do not apply “(Fischer 2007: 2).
Sybylle Fischer (2007) wrote Haiti: Fantasies of Bare Life in which she uses
Agamben’s conceptualization of bare life to criticize media and photographic
representations of Haitians. Understanding the portrayal of the Haitian body through the
lens provided by the concept of bare life is crucial to understanding how Haitians are
represented. Although for the remainder of this thesis I will focus on other aspects of
representational practices, specifically the portrayal of Haitians as a population in need of
intervention and security, I believe that this analysis deserves mention and is not
unrelated. I think that Fischer’s article articulates well the representation of Haitians as
depoliticized “others”, and the manner in which these representations are often
manifested in portrayals of Haitians as bodies in suffering. Fischer explains her tactic as,
Appropriating Agamben’s term, fantasies of “bare life”—where I take “bare life”
to be an emblem of a highly ambivalent attitude toward bodily degradation of
humans. What happens when we rhetorically, philosophically, or
photographically reduce human beings to their mere physical being, to their
suﬀering, to their mortality? (2007: 4)
Focusing on a book of photographs by photographer Bruce Gilden, Haiti (1996), Fischer
explores how the photographic representation of Haitians as bare lives, as depoliticized
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bodies, is illustrative of not just the exploitative nature of disaster photography5 but also
as a means of conceptualizing the political nature of suffering and leaving the viewer
with a particular understanding of Haitians as bare life. In this way,
Haiti is returned to the reader as the bare-boned, incomprehensible place of
unspeakable cruelty and bodily suffering, of Tonton Macoutes and “voodoo
doctors” and corpses drifting in muddy swimming pools, as a liminal space on the
edge of Western civilization, without the social and political practices and taboos
that constitute life in Western society (Fischer 2007: 3).
Fischer wrote this article in 2007. Arguably, the photographic representations of Haitian
earthquake victims only further serves to prove her (and Agamben’s) point. Haitians are
portrayed as bodies that are caught in the limits of the sovereign exception. What purpose
does it serve the public to show images of mass graves or of children in hospitals with
amputated arms? Fischer’s argues that it reveals the depoliticized nature of Haitians in
the public eye and ultimately it is reflective of the representational practices that produce
identity and meaning that create and circulate (and thus perpetuate) our understandings of
Haitians as apolitical, suffering beings. As Fischer argues,
Representation of violence creates a certain form of complicity because it engages
psychical structures of attraction and repulsion. Historical, philosophical, or
representational contextualization, the restoration of contingency, and the
reflexive awareness of standpoint, by contrast, work against this complicity (2007:
8).
For the remainder of this section, I will discuss the discursive representation of Haiti and
Haitians within academia, the media, and humanitarian organizations and how particular
identities are constructed to encourage or explain intervention and humanitarianism. Two
major themes can be discerned in academic articles and books, media reports and

5

Disaster Photography is a sensationalist and objectifying means of portraying disaster victims. Disaster
photography often portrays humans in a violent and inhumane way
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humanitarian policies and programs that I would like to focus on concerning how Haiti is
portrayed and represented. The first is the word hope. I would never suggest that hopes
and dreams are problematic, but instead want to focus on the representational
implications of one having “hope” for Haiti. The second is what I will call “blaming
history.” Academic writing, the media and humanitarian policies about Haiti often
discuss the reasons for Haiti’s underdevelopment and poverty and their portrayal of
Haiti’s history is illustrative of how representations of Haiti are cultivated and
constructed.
Is there “Hope” for Haiti?
“Haiti, poorest of countries in the Western Hemisphere, may now have some chance to
move into the future with greater hope for peace and economic advancement” (Catholic
Web 2006). Questioning if Haiti can ever move into the “future” and if Haiti has “hope”
to overcome its instability and underdevelopment paints a particular discursive picture of
Haiti and Haitians. Haitians are represented as the poorest of the poor and their poverty
along with their violent history seems to be insurmountable. Hope, these authors seem to
suggest, is something Haitians may not have or something that must be given to them.
Hans Veeken, an MSF aid worker, wrote an article for British Medical Journal about his
trip to Haiti in 1993 titled “Hope for Haiti?” Discussing the preparations for a trip to a
small island off the coast of Haiti, Veeken provides us with a gold mine of stereotypical
representations of Haiti and Haitians:
Nobody in town, however, could give me any sensible information on the current
situation on the island. Nobody had been there, but everybody had a horror story
to discourage me. “Take along drinking water because there is typhoid,” was the
advice given to me as I left for the island. The “tap-tap”, a small van meant for
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public transport, wriggled through the outskirts of Port au Prince. As usual, we
first had to refuel. At the gas station I noticed, instead of the normal pool of oil, a
pool of blood on the ground. To my astonishment I discovered in the bushes at the
side a corpse, beheaded. “Military,” said my companion. The facts of the case did
not seem to bother anybody; they are used to terror. (1993: 2)
Within a single paragraph Veeken broadly sweeps through the culture of rumors and
paranoia, to a reference to “tap-taps” the “small van meant for public transport”, implying
perhaps their inefficiency or in the very least their exoticness, to finally, of course, a
beheaded corpse and the subsequent “used to terror” analysis. Not all academic articles
are as blatant in their representations of Haiti, but the theme remains. Haiti is hopeless,
caught in a vicious cycle of violence and poverty. It is a cycle that millions of dollars of
aid and thousands of nonprofits have not been able to break and that Haitians, ultimately,
are “used to.”
Following the 2010 earthquake celebrities and non-profit organizations quickly
organized a fundraising event similar in nature to Band Aid, a “charity super group”
founded in 1984 to donate money to famine relief in Ethiopia. Hope for Haiti was based
on a similar principle: A large group of celebrities and musicians came together for a
musical fundraising telethon. While there were multiple criticisms of organizational
problems - Wycelf Jean’s organization, Yele Haiti, which hosted the event has had
multiple problems with the Internal Revenue Service, and there has been speculation that
some of the charity’s money has gone to rent and recording studios (The Smoking Gun
2010) - I would rather focus on the discursive importance of an entire population “having
hope”, and on the power relations inherent in the idea that celebrities, bands, people from
Western countries, etc., can “give hope”. Much like the language of “empowerment”
through which development agencies attempt to give power to the powerless, giving
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“hope”- an intangible but important emotion- to Haitians reveals the language of
intervention and humanitarianism. Hope for Haiti is something that must be bestowed on
Haitians by outside populations, because ultimately without foreign intervention, they are
potentially hopeless.
The power of hope within the realm of humanitarian discourses is not lost on
economists either. Paul Collier, a financial advisor for the United Nations states
optimistically, “Haiti is not hopeless” in his report for the Secretary General of the United
Nations: Haiti: From Natural Disaster to Economic Security in 2009. There is room for
economic growth by focusing on the opening up of free trade agreements, reducing tariffs
on exports, and improving the garment industry. Collier discusses the appropriately
named HOPEII, a free trade agreement that “gave Haiti uniquely favorable preferential
access to the US market” (2009: 3). Collier believes that Haiti does have hope and it lies
in free market capitalism.
The deployment of the word hope in discussions about Haiti reveals both the
power dynamics between Haiti and its benefactors, (i.e., the international community at
large), and the ability to “give hope” to a potentially hopeless population caught in
unimaginable poverty. This downward cycle of poverty and violence leads us to the
second issue, namely, the blaming of Haiti’s history.
History of Misery
“The root explanation of errant Haiti probably lies in the circumstances of the
independence of which it is so proud”(Crassweller 1971).
Academic and newspaper articles and policy reports about Haiti often start with a brief
overview of the history of Haiti. They often begin with a discussion of Haiti as the “pearl
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of Antilles,” the triumph of the first successful slave revolution, and then the subsequent
decline into poverty and isolation. They rarely fail to mention the debt owed to France
and the violent coups that have plagued the country since it achieved independence. What
is problematic about this narrative is not the recognition that history has played a part in
the making of modern Haiti, but instead the deterministic discussion about Haiti. Haiti is
portrayed as being caught in a vicious cycle that it cannot escape. Haitians are portrayed
as being caught in the past from which they cannot move forward. As the quote above by
the first “Hope for Haiti” article suggests, they cannot move into the future. The lack of
hope for Haiti, its inherent hopelessness, is due to its historical situation; it is trapped in
its violent past. As Pamela Constable suggests,
After the promising 1990 election, which was heralded as the first step toward
democracy, Haiti appears to have slipped back into the tradition of violent,
absolutionist politics that have dominated the country during the two centuries of
French plantation slavery and another 150 years of despotic, post revolutionary
self-rule (1993: 175).
Blaming Haiti’s history, or Haiti’s culture or Haiti’s traditionalism allows for the
construction of Haitians as a people who need of foreign assistance and intervention to
help them out of their past and into the future, a culture or nation who seem unable to
escape their “traditional” cycles of poverty. The academic tradition of painting Haiti’s
history as deterministic and insurmountable silences and ignores other understandings of
Haiti’s underdevelopment and political violence and constructs a vision of Haiti that
allows for intervention and creates and recreates a particular discursive representation of
Haiti.
“The Jan. 12, 2010 earthquake is only the latest tragedy in Haiti”s long history of
torment and strife” reads the introduction to Time Magazine’s 2010 photo essay “History
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of Misery.” In eleven slides, Haiti’s history is described from Christopher Columbus to
Papa Doc to the earthquake. Time’s piece paints an easily digestible view of Haiti’s
history. In simple terms, Haiti has always been in a state of crisis and Haitians have
always been oppressed. Media portrayal of Haitian history as one of misery and torment
and strife helps construct the identity of Haitians as that of people stuck in a downward
cycle of oppression and violence. Haitians are victims of their own history, which
continues to repeat itself in crisis after crisis: The earthquake, the cholera outbreaks, and
the hurricanes are only the latest in a long series of events that have battered the small
island.
These are only two examples of how discursive representations of Haiti help to
construct identities and meanings about Haiti as a country in need of intervention. In the
following section I will explore how the international community discursively represents
Haiti and Haitians as security threats. The portrayal of Haitians as poor, hopeless and
stuck in a cycle of poverty and violence aid in the construction of them as threats to
themselves and to international security.
Construction of the Haitian as a security threat
Jef Huysmans in The Politics of Insecurity (2006) describes the widening of security
studies to include non-military threats to states and communities. He focuses particularly
on the reframing of immigrants and refugees as security threats to the European Union
and the political implications of redefining what security is and how we understand and
deal with issues of “security:”
When established knowledge patterns are challenged by means of shifting the
meaning of one of its defining concepts both an identity and status problem occur.
Moving the meaning of security beyond military threats in an inter-state world did
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precisely something along these lines. In blurring the received meaning of the
concept of security it challenged and by implication made visible the implicitly
agreed and ritualized boundaries of the study of security in international relations
(Huysmans 2006: 21).
The increasing number of threats placed under the umbrella of “security” makes defining
security and security studies difficult and distracts from the understanding of “security as
a technique of government” (Huysmans 2006: 6). However, this thesis is not concerned
with how to define security as such, but instead how security, as a mechanism of power,
and in turn, humanitarian organizations as a mechanism of security, construct and create
security threats and then attend to them.
Constructing Haitians, especially young Haitian males, as security threats is not
the result of a simple risk calculation in which the acts of Haitians are enumerated and
counted and then determined to be risky, dangerous, or threatening. Instead, it is the
result of a social and historical construction of Haitians as risky, dangerous and
threatening. As the previous section discussed, Haitians “have a long history of violence”
and their abject poverty puts them at the extremes of human suffering. As poverty
increasingly becomes a security concern, so too do the impoverished individuals. Isin
(2004), drawing on Foucault, describes how biopower developed as a means of managing
populations:
Foucault called that power which took as its object to calibrate the relationship
between the body and the species-body as biopower. What was new about
biopower, he argued, was its simultaneously individualizing and totalizing
character. In other words, the object of biopower was a peculiar “calibration”.
Governing subjects required a calibration of their conduct to the requirements of
species-bodies—economy, population, and society—in a manner that involved
fine adjustments to both the body and the species-body (221)
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In the case of framing Haitians as security threats, what is of particular interest in this
passage is the concept of the “simultaneously individualizing and totalizing character” of
biopower and governmentality under neoliberalism. The individual, in this case the
Haitian, is constructed as a security threat to the community, to women and children, and
to international aid workers. Within constructing the Haitian individual as a threat there is
a simultaneous creation of a totalizing character of all Haitians as security threats. This
construction thus allows for an increase in control over the population by humanitarian
organizations.
Bigo’s analysis in “Governmentality of Unease” (2002) provides us with a
framework for understanding how the professionals in the “management of unease”
construct threats and identify risks to their polity:
It [the polity] is a “war-based polity,” a condition of generalized confrontation
that is no longer able to distinguish between private and public enemies. Because
it is based on claims about the need for survival at any price, on a real and
permanent struggle anchored in an eschatology of the worst kind, it generates a
distress policy, a misgiving policy, that transforms any change and any risk into
an intentional threat or enemy. Here is the main technique of securitization, to
transform structural difficulties and transformations into elements permitting
specific groups to be blamed, even before they have done anything, simply by
categorizing them, anticipating profiles of risk from previous trends, and
projecting them by generalization upon the potential behavior of each individual
pertaining to the risk category. (81)
Although framing Haitians as security threats may not be new, the professionalization
and institutionalization of the unease about risks and threats is, as Bigo describes.
Portraying Haitians as risks and threats to the international community, to Haitian women
and to themselves is not just about racism (which I will discuss later), but is also about
the management of unease. The securitization of Haitian IDPs and IDP camps is about
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categorizing, blaming and transforming the Haitian into a risk that needs to be secured
against.
Claudia Aradau (2004) describes the relationship between humanitarianism,
security, and governmentality in the case of trafficked women:
To expose the perverse relation between the humanitarian and security
articulations, I shall consider them as governmental processes: practical
interventions with the purpose of managing the phenomenon of trafficking.
Coined by Michel Foucault, “government” in this sense refers to acting on the
actions of individuals, taken either singly or collectively, so as to shape, guide,
conduct and modify the ways in which they conduct themselves. (253)
Humanitarian organizations, by identifying Haitians as security threats in need of
securing against are thus able to maintain an increasing level of control over the
internally displaced Haitians. The act of framing and constructing Haitians as threats is
fundamental to humanitarianism operating as a mechanism of security because it
maintains that the Haitians need security and that “we” need to be secured against the
Haitians. Security is necessary to development and only the international community, via
humanitarian organizations and the military, are able to create a secure environment for
Haitians. Haitians need to be secure in order to be protected from themselves.
MINUSTAH has been operating as a national policing force for the protection of
aid workers and securitizing the distribution centers and the distribution process to
safeguard against rioting and violence. The international community has framed Haitian
men as violent bodies that threaten not only the political stability of Haiti, but also the
lives of Haitian women and the aid workers distributing aid. In the New York Times of
February 2, an article about the food distribution coupons states, “On at least two days
last week, United Nations troops used tear gas after a mass of men rushed the food
distribution point and began grabbing what they could” (Cave and Thompson 2010). The
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use of MINUSTAH and military force during aid distribution and in the camps is a means
of controlling and supervising Haitian bodies and Haitians are constructed as threats to
themselves, to women, and to aid workers.
Haitians as Threats to Themselves
Haitian men are represented as rioting, looting and being generally violent. The
earthquake caused massive chaos in which everyone in Haiti was a potential victim. The
Times writes on January 18, “Convoys of lorries headed for the city’s worst-hit areas last
night but there were signs they had come too late to prevent another tragedy, with
Haitians turning on each other” (New York Times 2010). In the first month after the
earthquake hit, nearly every news article made a comment on either rioting or looting.
The international community was deeply concerned with the insecurity caused by the
earthquake and the subsequent rioting and looting, as well as the prisoners who escaped
from the Haitian jails:
UN officials believe the prisoners rioted after the quake, overwhelmed the guards
and escaped, Anderson Cooper reported. "When you have criminals, bandits,
assassins who terrorize the population - and we have all those types here – it’s a
big problem for the country," the prison’s warden Alexandre Jean Herisse, told
Cooper (CBS News 2010).
An Associated Press article reads, “Fear of looters and robbers has been one of the
factors slowing the delivery of aid” (2010) and a Christian Science Monitor article states,
“Haiti earthquake: despite fears of rioting, US starts airdrops: The US military has held
off on doing airdrops of food and water to victims of the Haiti earthquake, fearing they
could set off riots. But it now has troops in place to secure airdrop zones” (2010). The
articles portray Haitian men as people to fear; the male body is seen as a threat to the
order of things.
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The discursive representation of Haitians, especially Haitian males as violent
security threats not only justified the intervention, but also made it seem necessary, as if
the international community had to secure the situation. The discursive representation of
Haiti and Haitians as dangerous, desperate and lawless left little room for alternative
ways of responding to the earthquake. When I tell people I am writing about the use of
military and security apparatuses to respond to the earthquake, most people respond with
criticism. The military had to be deployed, “there was chaos”, “the Haitian government
was unable to respond”, “there was looting and rioting”. No one seems to questions the
assumption that Haitians are threats, risks, and bodies in need of securing against. I am
not arguing that rioting and looting did not happen, nor that prisoners did not escape from
jails, nor that Haiti was not turned upside down by the earthquake, nor that everyone
remained calm and no one resorted to violence. However, I am questioning the focus on
insecurity, violence, and theft by the media and humanitarian organizations and what the
portrayal of Haitians in this light reveals about the power relations and the means of
securing a population from itself.
I also argue that the focus on insecurity was misguided, self-perpetuating, and
racist. One example of the media portrayal of disasters, race and insecurity is from
Hurricane Katrina. The photos and captions of two men, one black and one white, each
carrying food from a grocery store provide a prime example of such framing. The caption
under the black man describes the man as “looting” a grocery store, whereas the caption
under the white man suggested he was salvaging food for his family. The example clearly
exhibits the effects race has on public opinion and the media. Henry A. Giroux (2006),
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quoting Zizek, examines how media representations of victims of Hurricane Katrina were
racialized and a reflection of race relations in America:
The philosopher, Slavoj Zizek, argued that “what motivated these stories were not
facts, but racist prejudices, the satisfaction felt by those who would be able to say:
“You see, Blacks really are like that, violent barbarians under the thin layer of
civilization!”(2005). It must be noted that there is more at stake here than the
resurgence of old-style racism; there is the recognition that some groups have the
power to protect themselves from such stereotypes and others do not, and for
those who do not—especially poor blacks—racist myths have a way of producing
precise, if not deadly, material consequences. Given the public’s preoccupation
with violence and safety, crime and terror merge in the all- too-familiar equation
of black culture with the culture of criminality, and images of poor blacks are
made indistinguishable from images of crime and violence. (176)
The link between race and the portrayal of Haitian men as security threats is clear. Black
men have long been framed as violent threatening. I will discuss the issue of race and
gender further in the following section.
Haitian Men as Security Threats to Haitian Women
The media portrays women and children, lumped together in their vulnerability, as being
the victims of Haitian male bodies. After the earthquake some headlines read “Children,
women most endangered by post-quake chaos in Haiti”(Xinhua 2010) and “Haitian
women become crime targets after quake” (ABC News 2010) and “Haitian girls face
increased vulnerability after quake” (Guering 2010) Although it is true that women and
children do have a higher level of vulnerability due to patriarchal power structures, it is
problematic when all males are rendered as potential security threats, and all women as
future rape victims. This obfuscates the multiple factors that contribute to the increase in
violence in Haiti following the earthquake.
The monolithic construction of gender into a binary of oppressor versus
oppressed, man versus woman, has influenced humanitarian aid distribution in Haiti. As
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men are framed as security threats and women as victims in need of protection, the
humanitarian aid agencies and other distributors of aid have adjusted their policies
accordingly. Women, who are portrayed as domestic, caring, and family-oriented are
viewed as more capable of receiving microcredit disaster assistance. Women are also
considered less likely to riot and resort to violence while they are waiting in line for aid
packages for hours on end. The humanitarian organizations do not trust men to wait
patiently in line, nor do they trust them to distribute the aid properly among their
families. This fear of rioting has led to the preference for one gender (female) to receive
humanitarian aid and assistance (New York Times 2010).
Additionally, there is evidence of racism on an institutional level that suggests
that the Haitian people need to be protected from themselves, especially the women from
the men. In Gaytri Spivak’s seminal piece, “Can the Subaltern Speak?” (1985), Spivak
made the now famous statement “white men saving brown women from brown men”(93).
Although she made this statement a quarter of a decade ago and was referring to the
abolition by the English of the suttee practice of women joining their deceased husbands
on the funeral pyre during the Victorian era, it still rings true and is revealing of the
manner in which the international community responded to the Haitian earthquake. Aid
organizations gave preference to female Haitians in the distribution of aid as a means of
protecting women from men who may turn violent while waiting in line. One of the main
concerns of the humanitarian organizations operating in Haiti’s was the rape of women
and children. Countless media articles were devoted to the increased number of in rapes
in the aftermath of the earthquake. One Christian Science Monitor article is titled “As if
providing food, shelter, and postquake health services wasn’t tough enough, Haiti relief
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workers are also focusing on keeping women from being raped as frustrations grow in
Port-au-Prince’s tent cities” (2010). In a similar vein, the Australian newspaper, Herald
Sun writes, “BANDITS are preying on Haiti earthquake survivors, even raping women,
in camps set up after the disaster” (2010). Most dramatically, The Independent writes
“Death, destruction ... and now rape” (2010).
The framing of Haitian women as vulnerable victims and Haitian men as security
threats who are undeserving of aid is problematic and potentially damaging. It denies the
agency of both men and women who were affected by the disaster by reducing them to
either deserving or undeserving, victims or perpetrators. It also has the grave potential of
creating a self-fulfilling prophecy in which men either begin to view themselves as the
security threats they are treated as and behave accordingly, or that by denying them
access to the services of aid organizations they will be pushed even further into
desperation and towards desperate acts.
Haitians as Threats to Aid Workers
An article titled, Aid for the Aid Givers by Lieutenant General Louis Lillywhite, describes
how the health and safety of the humanitarian aid workers is an increasing concern for
aid agencies and governments. Preventing attacks against aid workers is now a major
theme for humanitarian organizations. UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon describes the
“threat environments” as:
differentiated by the lack or presence of political motivation. The first is in areas
of general unrest where attacks on UN and humanitarian personnel are an
extension of the violence being experienced by the civilian population, either as
the target of local criminals, organised crime or by individuals in an unending
search for survival. It is the second environment which should be of particular
concern to the international community. It is in these zones, where the threats are
essentially political or politically related, that UN and humanitarian personnel are
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increasingly targeted by extremists, armed groups and disenfranchised elements in
multiple areas of operation. (Lillywhite 2011: 13).
This article does not specifically address Haiti, but humanitarian organizations are
restructuring policies and programs to maintain the safety of their aid workers
internationally. In “unstable environments,” the protection of aid workers is a top
priority; organizations are increasingly hiring private security firms, and have bodyguards
and armored cars. Even though Haiti is not a “war-zone,” it is considered a “failed state”
and a conflict zone and therefore the aid workers are in need of protection from the
potential threats presented by Haitians.
Security as a mechanism of governmentality manifests itself differently in
different spheres of life. For an internally displaced Haitian, security is more related to a
form of biopower, an increase in control and surveillance for the purpose of ameliorating
the threat posed by a population. Security means “peacekeeping” troops occupying a
country for over ten years and differences in access to goods based on gender, or “level
of vulnerability.” For aid workers, however, security manifests itself differently, although
even for aid workers, security measures entail an increase in control and surveillance. As
security presents itself as a dominating discourse in humanitarian aid distribution, aid
workers are affected by the security measures from 9:00 p.m. curfews, to armored cars, to
hourly “security situation” text messages.
However, the difference comes back to the questions asked at the beginning of
this chapter: Whose lives matter? As Butler suggests,
Lives are supported and maintained differently, and there are radically different
ways in which human physical vulnerability is distributed across the globe.
Certain lives will be highly protected, and the abrogation of their claims to
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sanctity will be sufficient to mobilize the forces of war. Other lives will not find
such fast and furious support and will not even qualify as “grievable” (2004: 32)
Haitians as homo sacers, as exceptional bodies caught in the extremes of poverty and
suffering, as a population used to violence, death and misery are ultimately less grievable
than aid workers from Western countries. There are no mass graves for international aid
workers. There are no obituaries for the deceased Haitians. Security for aid workers
means keeping them alive and protecting them from the Haitian threat. Security for
Haitians means containment.
The humanitarian industry, by framing Haitian men as security threats and Haitian
women and international aid workers as needing protection, is better able to enact a
heightened level of control over the aid distribution process and the lives of the Haitian
people. This unequal power distribution allows the international organizations to have
almost complete control of the distribution of food and water, sleeping arrangements, as
well as the “security” of the population. Haitians are discursively constructed and
represented as security threats, and, as I discuss in the final section, Haiti is constructed
as an insecure, failed state.
Threats to the World Order-The construction of Haiti as a “Failed State”
What constitutes a threat to the international order, to the security of the system of
the nation-states? The nation-state system, which blankets the world with a patchwork
quilt of ostensibly equally sovereign states, is the twentieth century’s attempt to eliminate
minorities, to give states to all “legitimate” nations and to create a system of states that all
follow similar rules and norms. If a state does not follow the rules and norms of the
“civilized,” modern world, what is it? How should the “international community”
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respond? States that do not comply, states that do not fit into the blanket, states that are
failed, rogue, fragile or weak are considered threats to the system. Failed states are seen
as breeding grounds for international terrorism, for illicit drug smuggling, for refugees
and economic migrants. Bad governance makes one a bad neighbor. The problems of the
failed states spill over into the less failed, more stable states, creating insecurity and
havoc. Threatening their own stability and security, the infiltration of “the other” (e.g.
refugees, immigrants) disrupts the legitimacy of the nation and creates a less homogenous
state. The failed state is more than just a security threat because of terrorism and drugs.
The failed state represents a breakdown in the system of nation-states and produces
fissures in the ostensible desire of the United Nations to give all states equal and absolute
sovereignty, because as addressed earlier, absolute national sovereignty does not and can
not exist.
Labeling a state failed, fragile, weak or rogue, and identifying it as a threat to
national and international security, allows for an increase in military and humanitarian
intervention. The failed state label becomes a mechanism that allows some states to
decide what it means to be a state and to increase the control of the international
community in the failed state. Once a state is labeled “failed,” it is no longer considered a
legitimate nation-state.
The Failed State in International Relations Theory
Failed states, not so long ago, were discussed as a problem of foreign aid or social
theory. Only prescient thinkers and policy makers identified them as a priority of
national security. The atrocities of September 11, 2001, did not make failed states a
problem but very much did trigger recognition that severe civic dysfunction in one
part of the globe might well have consequences elsewhere. An Afghanistan or a
Somalia has first and final responsibility for its own future. At the same time, so
widely can such a state spread disruption that “its” affairs and “ours” now can be
said to be segregated only in a carefully qualified way. New alertness about
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national security has brought an unprecedented increase in creative analysis of the
problem: What to do about failed states? (Grant 2004: 1)
The prescient thinkers of the failed state as a security threat certainly had foresight about
the implications of state failure on Western countries’ perceptions of state security,
though perhaps not in the way Grant has suggested. Instead of foreseeing that failed
states would become security threats, international relations theories have influenced the
construction of what exactly is a threat to state security. The 2002 National Security
Strategy (NSS) of the United States explicitly states that failed (or in this case “weak”)
states are a threat to American national security:
“The events of September 11, 2001, taught us that weak states, like Afghanistan,
can pose as great a danger to our national interests as strong states. Poverty does not
make poor people into terrorists and murderers. Yet poverty, weak institutions, and
corruption can make weak states vulnerable to terrorist networks and drug cartels
within their borders” (NSS 2002: 4).
The weak and fragile state is viewed as a security threat to the developed world and as
such it is in the interest of the Western countries to help develop failed and weak states.
Additionally, failed states cost the international community money. USAID reports that
failed states “can be costly in financial as well as human terms. The UN estimates that the
eight most expensive cases of state collapse in the 1990s cost the international
community $250 billion” (2003: 18).
Seth D. Kaplan, one of the most well-known and prolific scholars of fragile states,
writes extensively on how to better “develop” fragile states. In the Fixing Fragile States
insert he writes,
Fragile states are a menace. Their lawless environments spread instability across
borders, provide havens for terrorists, threaten access to natural resources, and
consign millions of people to poverty. But Western attempts to reform these
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benighted places have rarely made things better... to avoid revisiting the carnage
and catastrophes seen in places like Iraq, Bosnia, and the Congo, the West needs to
rethink its ideas on
fragile states and start helping their peoples build
governments and states that actually fit the local landscape (Kaplan 2008).
Kaplan’s approach, which I will explore in detail, reflects the strategy most scholars and
policymakers have on “developing” failed and fragile states. Although he claims to offer
an alternative approach, his assumptions about what fragile states are—“countries unable
to administer their territories effectively” (5) - and the way of “fixing” them- only a
sustained and coherent program lasting generations, led by one outside power, and
featuring significant foreign involvement in the management of governing bodies and
security forces and large investments in the education of local elites can hope to pay
dividends” (31)—are strikingly similar to past and current interventions in failed states.
Kaplan argues that a lack of “social cohesiveness” is one of the main factors that
influence state failure and weakness. In a chart comparing state characteristics, he lists 14
properties of fragile states (see table below)
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The first characteristic that is listed is “formed around cohesive group with shared
identity,” while the second is “common national identity.” Throughout Fixing Fragile
States the need for a “national identity” crops up again and again. For Kaplan, bad
governance comes from not having a cohesive national identity.
However, it is important to note that Kaplan does not describe Haiti as a “fragile
state.” It instead refers to Haiti as failed. “A completely failed state - such as Somalia,
Haiti, Liberia, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)- is one where the state has
withered away in the face of violence, warlordism, or criminal activity” (Kaplan 2008: 5).
Kaplan’s characterization of state fragility is still useful for understanding discourses
about Haiti, because despite the fact that Kaplan says Haiti is not fragile, the only reason
it is not is because the state has “completely withered away.” If we use Kaplan’s
understanding of state fragility, as if there is a distinct path from stability to instability,
Haiti lies at the very end of the spectrum. But what does Kaplan’s first characteristic of
state fragility – i.e. “Formed around diverse populations with little shared history”- mean
in the case of Haiti? At first glance, it might seem that Kaplan leaves Haiti out because it
does not fit this definition, but if one takes into account the extreme class distinctions in
Haiti, and the extremely long history of class divisions between the very rich and the very
poor, perhaps his analysis is legitimate. Unfortunately, Kaplan is more likely referencing
ethnic diversity.
Robert I. Rotberg is another prolific scholar on the failed state. In his dramatic
book, State Failure and State Weakness in a TIME OF TERROR (2003) Rotberg takes a
slightly different approach to understanding state failure than Kaplan. Rotberg recognizes
that state failure is more complex than ethnic diversity. “Failed states are tense, deeply
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conflicted, dangerous and contested bitterly by warring factions” (5). Rotberg outlines
both the causes and indicators of failed states, though the differences between the two are
obfuscated. The “causes” and “indicators” of state failure include the tendency to have
“more potholes” in roads and privatized educational and health systems, which can only
be accessed by the upper class (7). Rotberg also cites corruption as an indicator of state
failure. “Corruption flourishes in many states, but in failed states it often does so on an
unusually destructive scale” (8). Another indicator of state failure is a low or declining
GDP. It seems almost a moot point to suggest that many if not all states exhibit at least
some of these characteristics. In many, many countries, the United States included,
quality healthcare and education is limited to those who can afford it, and one would be
hard-pressed to find a single country without potholes in its roads. But Rotberg’s analysis
is problematic on another level. States that are deemed failed, fragile, weak or rogue do
have more extreme problems. It is difficult to find a road in post-earthquake Haiti without
potholes, and in fact, “potholes” do not begin to describe road conditions there.
Carrefour, a “suburb” of Port Au Prince, according to Google maps, is nine kilometers
from Port Au Prince and should take twelve minutes to reach, but in reality the roads are
so impassable it can take up to two hours. Haiti is extremely corrupt, and access to any
kind of healthcare or education is and was extremely limited, even before the earthquake.
The problem with Rotberg’s analysis is not that these things happen everywhere, but that
they are not the causes of state failure. Although I argue in this paper that the failed state
is a construction of the international community, there are reasons why Haiti is one of the
poorest countries in the world. Although it would be foolhardy to blame the international
community entirely for impoverishing the world, it is equally ridiculous to not even

105

mention Western countries’ involvement in the underdevelopment of Haiti (other than
referencing how corrupt politicians have misused international aid money).
Haiti as a Failed, Fragile, Weak or Rogue State
Locating Haiti in international relations debates about state failure and weakness is
difficult because in many ways it does not fit the normal mold of the failed state as a
security threat. On one hand, it fits the definitions by think-tanks and government policy
makers. The United States Government Accountability Office defines failed and failing
states as “nations where governments effectively do not control their territory, citizens
largely do not perceive the government as legitimate, and citizens do not have basic
public services or domestic security” (GAO 2007: 5). The Center for Global
Development defines fragile states as poor countries that have difficulties performing the
core functions of statehood, security, services, and legitimate government. They also
have a lack of capacity and a lack of political will (Carment, Press and Stamy 2010). The
National Security Council defines “weak states” as lacking “the capacity to fulfill their
sovereign responsibilities,” and argues that weak states, “do not have enforcement,
intelligence, or military capabilities to assert control over their entire territory” (National
Security for Combating Terrorism 2003: 20). Haiti fits into each of these categories.
However, when theorists attempt to understand why states fail, Haiti is seen as an
anomaly. According to Rotberg,
Haiti has always been on the edge of failure, particularly during the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries. But its entrenched weaknesses include no ethnic, religious or
other communal cleavages. There are no insurgent movements. Nor has Haiti
experienced radical or rapid deflation in standards of living and expectations, like
Argentina in 2002 and Russia in the 1990s. Haiti has always been the poorest polity
in the Western Hemisphere.
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And,
Haiti, even under President Aristide (1990-91, 1994-96, 2001- [2004]), [was]
gripped in a vise of weakness. Yet given very limited organized internal dissidence
and almost no internal ethnic, religious or linguistic cleavages within Haitian
society - except a deep distrust by the majority of the upper classes, and of mulattos
because of their historic class affiliations - the ingredients of major civil strife are
absent. Failure demands communal differences capable of being transformed into
consuming cross-group violence. Haiti thus seems condemned to remain weak, but
without failing (2004: 19-20).
Organizations, such as the World Bank and Foreign Policy magazine with the Fund
for Peace, have made attempts to quantify failed and weak states and rank each state
accordingly. The World Bank uses Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA)
and Low Income Countries under Stress (LICUS) to rank states based on a set of criteria.
The World Bank created the CPIA to help decide on resource allocation. The CPIA
measures sixteen criteria based on four clusters, economic, social, structural and the
public sector. According to worldbank.org, “The CPIA measures the extent to which a
country’s policy and institutional framework supports sustainable growth and poverty
reduction, and consequently the effective use of development assistance. The outcome of
the exercise yields both an overall score and scores for all of the sixteen criteria that
compose the CPIA” (The World Bank 2010). Therefore, the World Bank determines
which states are more fragile than others and then allocates funds accordingly.
Foreignpolicy.com and the Fund for Peace have been publishing The Failed State Index
since 2005, and characterize failed states as the “world’s most vulnerable nations.”
Foreign Policy examines twelve indicators, such as demographics, refugee flows,
economic development, and intervention. Foreign policy uses the Conflict Assessment
System Tool (CAST) to calculate The Failed State Index by rating twelve indicators,
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assessing state institutions, identifying surprise factors, and mapping conflicts and in
relation to the “failed state” index. According to Foreign Policy’s 2010 Failed State
Index, Haiti ranks number eleven, falling directly behind Pakistan. Somalia takes first
place for the third year in a row, followed by Chad and Sudan. According to a Rand
report, “A National Academy of Public Administration report of 2006 on why foreign aid
has failed in Haiti summarized general donor opinion which has variously characterized
Haiti as a nightmare, predator, collapsed, failed, failing, parasitic, kleptocratic, phantom,
virtual or pariah state” (2010). The RAND report is particularly interesting, because it
reveals the social construction of “the failed state” and the lack of consistency in how to
“label” Haiti. The international community sees Haiti as a failed state and this has a
profound effect on how states and international humanitarian agencies interact with Haiti
and the Haitian population.
Although it may initially seem counterproductive to my argument, in the following
section I will use academic and media articles which suggest that Haiti fulfills most, if
not all, the qualifications of a “failed state.” By doing this, I hope to explore how most
international relations theories are misguided in their understanding of state failure and
their assumption about what it means for the system of nation-states. Instead of failed
states being a threat to the security of wealthier, stronger, more stable states, these failed
weak fragile and rogue states are a threat to the very system of nation-states. By threat to
the system I do not mean the human security of residents, nor the sanctity of the border,
but to the legitimacy of the system itself.
What makes a failed, fragile, weak state? Even without delving into the problematic
mixture of causes and effects, what are the characteristics? For the Failed State Project at
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Purdue University state failure is defined “by the patterns of governmental collapse
within a nation which often bring demands (because of the refugees they foster, the
human rights they abridge and their inability to forestall starvation and disease) which
threaten the security of their surrounding states and region” (quoted in Rotberg 2003: 24).
According to most other sources, failed states are, as noted above, states that are unable
to provide basic services for their citizens. Of course, there are thirty other definitions and
terms to describe the basic premise of state failure and state weakness, but for
simplicity’s sake this thesis will focus on these definitions. Failed states are framed as
having problems with drug smuggling, inefficient bureaucracies, producing a vast
number of refugees and migrants, and being hotbeds for international terrorism. In the
following section I will describe how Haiti has experienced, or is perceived to experience
all of the following problems.
Drug Smuggling
Drug smuggling, a major issue in Western media because of the “War on Drugs,” is seen
not just as the infiltration of illegal drugs into countries, but also a lack of control of
borders. The borders of failed states are seen as extremely fluid and unregulated,
allowing for the passage of persons and other illicit materials. This makes Western
borders even more difficult to patrol and securitize. In an article about “Haiti’s Drug
Problem,” the United States Institute of Peace writes,
The remaining ten percent of illicit drugs is shipped through central and eastern
Caribbean. In recent years, successful enforcement efforts in Jamaica have reduced
trafficking through that country. At the same time, President Chavez’s antiAmerican policies have reduced counter-narcotics cooperation and resulted in
sharply increased cocaine shipments from Venezuela through Haiti and the
Dominican Republic on the Island of Hispaniola. U.S. government agencies
estimate that 83 metric tons or about eight percent of the cocaine entering the
United States in 2006 transited either Haiti or the Dominican Republic. Haiti has

109

1,200 miles of unprotected coastline and 225 miles of un-patrolled land border.
Drug shipments by "fast boats" and small planes land at tiny ports and on
clandestine airstrips scattered along Haiti’s southern coast. Haiti’s under-strength
and dysfunctional police force is unable to respond to the challenge, as traffickers
often take as little as five minutes to offload their cargo and refuel. Haiti’s tiny
coast guard has only two patrol boats, 95 personnel, and no air assets. Corruption
among Haiti’s law enforcement authorities is common. A near-record seizure of
925 pounds of cocaine on May 31, 2007 in the coastal town of Loegane highlights
these problems. The drugs were discovered at a roadside checkpoint in vehicles
with government license plates. Five police officers were among the ten people
arrested (USIP 2007)
Inefficient Bureaucracies, Corrupt Politicians and Undemocratic Elections
Corruption, elections and bad bureaucracies go hand in hand and each can be an
indicator of a failed state, though, many countries that are not labeled as failed experience
these problems as well. In many ways, Haiti is a prime example of each of these issues. It
is difficult to find an article about Haiti that does not mention the word “corruption.”
Haiti is considered to be corrupt from top to bottom. Whether it is politicians misusing
aid funds or military and police forces taking bribes or intimidating citizens into
extracting bribes, there is no end to stories about the misuse of funds. One question that is
often asked of developing countries, especially Haiti, is why, after billions of dollars in
aid money, development projects, and international trade, are these countries still poor
and sometimes getting poorer. One relatively quick and easy answer is corruption and, as
the RAND report suggests, political culture.
The Interim Haiti Recovery Commission was established because of the
international community’s concerns about the inability of the Haitian state to manage and
efficiently use the billions of dollars donated to the rebuilding effort. The lack of
infrastructure, corruption and “political culture” are considered reflections of the failure
of the Haitian state and barriers to rebuilding. The RAND report, Rebuilding the Haitian
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State remarks, “Haiti’s poverty, like its governmental weakness, is a product of its
political culture” (RAND 2010: 47). The RAND report also argues that,
Historically, the Haitian state has served as an apparatus by which elites extract
rents from the impoverished population, not as a means of serving Haiti’s citizens.
Corruption is a serious problem; Haiti ranked 168 of 180 in Transparency
International’s Corruption Perceptions Index in 2008, in the same league as Iran
and Turkmenistan. Since 2002, when it was first included in the rankings, it has
slipped slightly, from the 87th percentile to the 93rd. Haiti also ranks very low on
broader governance indicators (46).
In 2007 the USAID operational planned summary focused much of its attention on the
corruption in Haiti. Several anti-corruption programs were started because, as it suggests,
“Haiti has suffered from bad governance for decades. Corruption is endemic and state
resources are diverted; local governance is ignored; and Parliament often does not
function. To avoid political unrest, Haiti urgently needs to become a democratic, wellgoverned state” (USAID 2007: 12).
Haitian Refugees and Migrants
A large exodus of displaced persons, regardless of their reasons for exit (war, economics,
famine, or individual persecution) is seen as symptomatic of state failure and fragility.
The state is no longer able to provide services for its people and they are forced to leave
their country for another. A 1992 Foreign Policy article suggests that as states begin to
fail and start to become more violent they “imperil their own citizens and threaten their
neighbors through refugee flows” (Helman and Ratner 1992: 3). International
humanitarian law and domestic policy-makers are generally unsure about how to
intervene in cases of massive migration movements. However, there have been several
interventionist attempts that have been spurned at least partially by refugee flows. In
Dowety and Loescher in Refugee Flows as Grounds for International Action (1997)
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suggest that the unilateral interventions in Haiti were influenced by a desire to curb
refugee flows. UN resolutions in 1994 included the need to end military behavior that
was causing Haitian displacement.
The U.S. government at this point was impelled to push for a quick resolution to the
situation, in part because of the continuing embarrassment and political difficulties
of dealing with Haitian refugees and would-be refugees. In his public address on
the eve of intervention, President Clinton stressed the need “to secure our borders
and preserve stability in our hemisphere,” adding more specifically: “We have a
particular interest in stopping brutality when it occurs so close to our shores.... As
long as Cedras rules, Haitians will continue to seek sanctuary in our nation. This
year, in less than two months, more than 21,000 Haitians were rescued at sea by our
Coast Guard and Navy. Today more than 14,000 refugees are living at our naval
base in Guantanamo. The American people have already spent $177 million to
support them” (Dowety and Loescher 1996: 64).
This quote is of extreme importance to this thesis because I argue that failed states are
constructed as security threats in order to justify intervention. The portrayal of refugees
and displaced persons as threats plays a large part in the construction of Haiti and the
failed state as security threats that need or deserve or require intervention.
International Terrorism
Although there has been plenty of “terrorism” within Haiti, there has been no
“international terrorism” to speak of. There have been no Haitian bombings of United
States or other foreign cities and buildings, and there does not seem to be an anti-west
movement that operates inside of Haiti. However, the International Organization for
Migration (IOM) suggests that without proper diligence this may change:
Haiti’s porous borders and less-than-sufficient controls create an environment that
trans-border criminal networks tend to exploit, including some well-documented
cases. More importantly, while Haiti has been spared major terrorist incidents so
far, the lack of control makes Haiti a convenient “back office” that international
terrorist networks might exploit in the future for training and planning action on
foreign targets. The attraction of Haiti is likely to increase with the robust
counter-terrorist and border security measures being taken in most other countries
in the world (IOM 2007).
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I think the previous examples show that even before the 2010 earthquake in Haiti, Haiti
was considered, at least by policymakers, governments, and the media, as a failed state
and because of this failed state status, a threat to the national security of the United States
and other neighboring countries.
Risk
Failed states are risky. There is a great amount of uncertainty not only about what failed
states are, but also how they will behave, what their populations will do, and the
implications of state failure to the international community. The calculation of what
constitutes a security threat relies on a calculation of risk and speculation about what
might potentially occur to threaten a society. There has been a proliferation of scholarly
examination of what constitutes the “new”, or post-Cold War, or post-9/11 threats or
risks. According to Aradau,
Risk-based perspectives to security differ considerably from their threat-based
counterparts in how they approach the question of security and in the policy
prescriptions and governmental technologies they instantiate. Whereas the latter
tend to emphasize agency and intent between conflicting parties, risk-based
interpretations tend to emphasize systemic characteristics, such as populations at
risk of disease or environmental hazard. Moreover, threat-based interpretations rely
on intelligence in an attempt to eliminate danger, while risk relies on actuarial-like
data, modeling and speculations that do not simply call for the elimination of risk
but develop strategies to embrace it. In short, whereas the concept of threat brings
us in to the domain of the production, management and destruction of dangers, the
concept of risk mobilizes and focuses on different practices that arise from the
construction, interpretation and management of contingency (2008: 148).
The construction of the failed state as a security threat is the result of risk calculations.
Failed states are risky because they are unpredictable. The do not fit into the normal
category of the “nation-state” that has been constructed as the legitimate means of
governing territories. Their problems spill over into neighboring countries, and cause
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forced migration, terrorism, and drug smuggling. They threaten the very system of
nation-states.
That there are multiple definitions and nomenclatures for the “failed state” and that
no one is entirely sure which states are actually “failed” and which are “fragile” or
“weak” or “rogue” reveals the risk calculation involved. Risks are unpredictable and they
are also impossible to control and, as Aradau (2008) suggests, the construction and
interpretation of risk is more important than the elimination of threat. In the case of Haiti,
as the IOM quote earlier suggests, there is a possibility that Haiti will become a haven for
terrorists. The fear that Haitians would flood into the United States following the
earthquake was not realized, but the risk of it happening was of great concern to US
policymakers and politicians. Additionally, as the above quote suggests “systematic
characteristics” are a foundation for the construction of risks. The failed, fragile state
discourse focuses almost entirely on pinpointing the “characteristics” of failed states, and
how they are systematic to the state, or the culture, or the people. For example, the
Haitian people (or state, or politicians) suffer from systematic corruption. Characterizing
failed states, creating charts, as Kaplan does, or ranking them, such as
Foreignpolicy.com’s Failed State Index does, relies on calculating risks and constructing
systematic characteristics of state failure.
Failed states are also constructed as risks because of the anxiety felt by the
“international community” about the weakening of the “state.” State failure, coupled with
the growth in power of a global political order, such as the increasing control by
international non-governmental organizations has led to the fear that the state is
“withering away.” As Doty suggests in Anti-Immigrantism in Western Democracies,
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What has become known as the “globalization thesis” suggests that states have been
weakened in the sense that they are often unable to fully control the movement of
goods, capital, people, and culture, which are all elements of globalization. Losing
control over borders erodes the effectiveness of states, undermines their
sovereignty, and by extension raises questions about the type of international
system that might be occurring (2003: 5).
The failed states offers a particularly difficult risk for states because one of their
fundamental “characteristics” is that they do not have control over their territories and
borders, and the porousness of their borders directly affects the inflow of goods and
people into non-failed states. Also, on a different level, the failed state discourse brings
up questions about what to do with those unfortunate failed states. They challenge the
legitimacy of the nation-state system, because part of that system rests on the idea of each
state having absolute state sovereignty.
In his piece on the governmentality of unease, Didier Bigo discusses how the
construction of threats and risks is not just the result of xenophobia or distrust of
immigrants, but is also the result of politicians, media, and bureaucrats constructing them.
As Bigo argues,
the securitization of the immigrant as a risk is based on our conception of the state
as a body or a container for the polity. It is anchored in the fears of politicians about
losing their symbolic control over the territorial boundaries. It is structured by the
habitus of the security professionals and their new interests not only in the
foreigner, but in the “immigrant.” These interests are correlated with the
globalization of technologies of surveillance and control going beyond the national
borders. It is based, finally, on the “unease” that some citizens who feel discarded
suffer because they cannot cope with the uncertainties of everyday life. This worry,
or unease is not psychological. It is a structural unease in a “risk society” framed by
neoliberal discourses in which freedom is always associated at its limits with
danger and (in)security (2002: 65).
Although Bigo is discussing immigration directly, I think the theory can be applied to the
failed state as well, and not just because of the immigrants it produces, but because of the
general unease that is felt about failed states. State failure is hotly debated and discussed,
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and as the NSS report suggested in 2002, the “weak” state is one of the greatest threats to
national security.
The insistence that there are “good” states and “bad” states is a fundamental aspect
of governmentality and sovereignty. The ability to decide which states are good and
which are bad rests in the hands of the sovereign and is dependent on the ability to
distinguish between the two, and act on the basis of this distinction. If a country that is
“failed” poses no real threat (via terrorism, drugs, or immigration) is it truly a threat?
Perhaps yes, because, as Aradau suggests, it may become a threat in the future or it
possesses the necessary qualities of being a risk.
Representational Power
Finally, I wish to explore the significance of how countries are represented in the global
order. Understanding why some states are “failed” or “fragile” is not just about
pinpointing the characteristics of a “failed” state, but instead should explore the power
dynamics and assumptions behind the act of labeling a state “failed,” as well as the global
structures that have encouraged and/or discouraged failure or underdevelopment.
Although it would be easy to suggest that, regardless of what one calls a state without a
legitimate government, or a state with prolonged conflict, or a state that lacks the ability
to enforce human rights and the security of its citizens, the state is still unable to provide
for its citizens. The name or label does not change the state’s inabilities and failures as a
state. However, as I discussed earlier in this chapter, the act of labeling is not only a
reflection of global structures, inequalities, and relations. Labeling also affects how
governments, nonprofit organizations and individuals understand what it means to be
“legitimate” and the programs and policies which are designed to address not only the
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rebuilding of the failed state, but also the needs and abilities of individuals who reside in
the fragile state. The performativity of labeling “failed” states is a reflection of global
power structures and discourses.
Underestimating the power of discourse and knowledge construction in a discussion
of failed states would deny not only the power to decide what constitutes a “good” or
“strong” state but how discourses determine and validate foreign intervention,
humanitarian or otherwise.
The construction of North and South identities is not a new phenomenon, but
different terms come in and out of vogue. During the Cold War there were three worlds.
From the 1970s on, countries were labeled “developing” and “developed.” Academia has
also had its fair share: Wallerstein labeled them the core, the semi periphery and the
periphery, and now it fashionable in some circles to say the Global North and the Global
South. Derrida (2005) explores the concept of the “rogue state” and by relating it to
Schmitt’s sovereign exception and Kant’s idea that “the reason of the strongest is always
best.” Derrida describes the sovereign exception as,
the de facto situation, the relations of force (military, economic, technoscientific,
and so on) and the differences of force end up determining through their intrinsic
effectiveness a world law that, in the aftermath of a world war, is in the hands of
certain sovereign states that are more powerful than other sovereign states (100).
Derrida argues that there are “(no) more rogue states” because “as soon as there is
sovereignty, there is abuse of power and a rogue state. Abuse is the law of use; it is the
law itself, the “logic” of a sovereignty that can reign only by not sharing” (2005: 102).
There are no rogue states because all states are rogue.
The construction of “failed states” is an exercise in deciding the exception. Failed
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states like Rwanda, Somalia and Haiti are considered nation-states that no longer have
functioning democratic governments. The definition of a functioning democratic
government, as well as the ability to structure, label, and designate states as either failed
or real, is derived from the sovereign exception. Nation-states are built on the premise of
the ability of a state to govern and protect its own interests. The normative definition of
legitimate states posits the nation and the sovereignty of the nation as the most important
and defining feature within the geographical boundaries of states. However, as Derrida
has suggested, some states are more sovereign than others and this allows them to decide
what the exception is. In the case of a system of nation-states, the international
community has the ability or the right to decide on the exception and the norm, in this
case state failure. By deciding the exception, the state also decides the rule. The contrast
between “real” states, such as the United States, and failed states, such as Haiti, allows
for the denial of “sovereign rights.” When a state becomes a failed, rogue, or fragile state
it becomes a threat to international stability.
The relationship between power and knowledge, as explored by Foucault (1994),
helps to conceptualize the creation of the failed state in international relations. Foucault
discusses how knowledge is created and sustained by power. Knowledge, argues
Foucault, “circulates and functions in relation to power” (1994: 331). The “regime of
knowledge” in the failed state discourses is used to create an understanding of what it
means to be a good or bad state and the role of the state and government in individual
societies. It relies on the assumption that the Western style of rationalization and
individualization is the preferred and ideal way of organizing society. The international
community, be it an international organization or a wealthy Western country, has the
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power to conceptualize and create the knowledge of not only what represents a threat or a
risk, but also the identities and labels of countries that are deemed threats and risks.
The modern system of nation-states relies on the stated assumption of ethnically
homogenous, equally sovereign states as the only and ideal way of organizing societies.
Additionally, the state is propagated as the set of institutions that must bestow its citizens
with rights, services and protection. A “failed state” is the state that fails to fit into the
model, the ideal. The failed state contradicts and threatens the system of nation-states and
because of this, the failed state is constructed as both a risk and threat to the global order.
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Conclusion
Humanitarian intervention has become an important mode and even a dominant
frame of reference for Western political intervention in global scenes of
misfortune, both in cases of armed conflict and natural disasters and around their
more or less direct consequences in the form of epidemics, famine, physical
injury, and emotional trauma. No war is now without its humanitarian corridors
and its humanitarian workers. And no Western military intervention into another
country is now without its justification on humanitarian grounds (Fassin
2007:508)

The previous chapters have all focused on the humanitarian response to the internally
displaced Haitians following the earthquake of 2010. I focused primarily on
humanitarianism as a mechanism of security and the framing of displaced Haitians as
security threats. I engaged with the discourses of the media and humanitarian
organizations, as well as interviews conducted with aid workers in Haiti following the
earthquake. Exploring the dynamic relationships of humanitarian organizations, the
international community, the Haitian government and the internally displaced Haitians, I
attempted to problematize the many assumptions about international humanitarian aid
and the Haitian population.
There were three major focuses of the thesis: the increasing use of security in the
distribution of humanitarian aid, humanitarianism operating as a mechanism of security
and the construction of meaning and threat. I situated both Haiti and the humanitarian
industry historically to illustrate that although the current situation may be unique or
extreme in some ways (for example, the use of military to directly distribute aid, or that
one million Haitians are still internally displaced), when situating these seemingly
separate events historically, we can see they are the result of existing sets of relationships
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and patterns and most importantly, how the increasing use of security as a technique of
government is being manifested in humanitarianism.
The first chapter engaged with humanitarianism as a form of political intervention
and as a reflection of the presumed failure of a state to adequately respond to disasters
and provide for its citizens. I described three particular epochs in humanitarian assistance
and the ways in which global political power and changing conceptualizations of poverty,
development and human rights have transformed humanitarian assistance. The chapter
also detailed the history of intervention in Haiti to show how representations and
discourses about Haiti as being “in need” of humanitarianism and intervention are
grounded in past encounters with the international community. The genealogy of
humanitarian intervention and Haiti’s history of intervention situated the response to the
2010 earthquake within a socio-historical context to illuminate the complexities of
humanitarianism

and

Haiti’s

relationship

with

the

international

community.

Understanding these complexities allows us to understand the response as not an isolated
event, but a reflection of multiple processes, trends and associations between the “North”
and the “South” and Haiti and the international community.
The second chapter argued that humanitarianism, because of its particular
relationship with sovereignty, power, and the global political order, and because of its
bureaucratization, organizational structure and funding is functioning as a mechanism of
governance and is increasingly operating as mechanism of security. By focusing on the
Haitian IDP camp as a site of security, I attempted to show how humanitarianism works
to monitor and control the IDP population in an attempt to create a more “secure”
environment. Discourses about poverty and development are now tied to “security” and
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humanitarian organizations operate under the assumption that without “security” there
can be no development, human rights, or even aid distribution. However, how security
mechanisms operate differs depending populations they engage. The lives of aid workers
are secured in different ways than the lives of internally displaced Haitians. Aid and
security are distributed based on levels of “vulnerability” and by constructing notions of
who is deserving of humanitarian aid and who is not.
The final chapter discussed the construction of Haitians and the Haitian state as a
threat in need of security and humanitarian assistance. The discursive power of
constructing realities about the Haitian population is a political act that reveals the power
of some to determine the knowledges and understandings of others. Humanitarian
organizations operating in Haiti have the ability to create and recreate the identities of
Haitians as hopeless, caught in a vicious cycle of poverty and as threats to themselves, to
Haitian women and to aid workers. The final chapter also discussed the construction of
Haiti as a failed state, and the power of deciding what constitutes a functioning state
versus what constitutes a failure to the system of nation-states. It argued that our
perception of Haitians, especially Haitian males, as threats in need of securing against
and the Haitian state as failed, fragile or rogue, is a reflection of the discourses and
practices of the international community.
Underlying this thesis is the power of telling a story and how knowledge and
narration intersect with our understanding of events and actors. Our knowledge about the
earthquake in Haiti in 2010 and the international humanitarian organizations, the
international community and internally displaced Haitians is a reflection of the unequal
power in the production of dominant discourses. Trouillot (1995), as mentioned in the
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introduction, describes how power influences knowledge and narration. He focuses on
the history of Haiti to illuminate the histories that have been kept silent, the histories that
have created subjects and the histories that have influenced our current understandings of
Haiti and Haitians. This thesis argues that dominant narratives about Haitians are a
reflection of the power dynamics in knowledge construction and that those narratives
influence not only how the world sees and understands Haiti, but also how the
international community deals with Haiti. The construction of Haitians as being in need
of intervention and security and as threats to be secured against allows for the
international community, through humanitarian organizations, to engage with Haiti in a
particular way.
Throughout the thesis I made mention of my time in Haiti doing field research in
July of 2010. For the most part I did not focus on the interviews I did there because I did
not receive a surplus of objective empirical data. Instead, my time in Haiti gave me a
clearer understanding of what life in Haiti is like for both Haitians and aid workers.
Although I did do formal interviews with aid workers, I found casual discussions with
people to be more informative. Therefore, most of my research included attending UN
cluster meetings and speaking to aid workers, both domestic and international, about
what their day to day lives were like and what security meant for them and for the people
they were serving. In those situations people were generally more candid and willing to
talk. As my time in Haiti went on I grew to understand the complexities of humanitarian
assistance. Most of the aid workers were not only emotionally and physically exhausted,
but they also expressed concern and frustration with their own organizations, as well as
the Haitian government. This is representative of Barbara Harrell-Bond’s (2002)
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assertion that giving aid can be detrimental to both the refugee (or in this case the IDP)
and the aid worker and reveals the multiple ways and levels in which power is
distributed. With that said, most of the aid workers I spoke with believed they were doing
the right thing, and were happy to be able to help Haitians during their time in need.
This leads me to another point, which is the question of intervention. For multiple
reasons I did not give a definitive verdict for or against humanitarian intervention. I do
not believe that doing so would be realistic or constructive. I do however, argue in this
thesis that the current ways in which security is being articulated in humanitarian
interventions is a problem, and that although there is no way I would ever argue all
intervention is bad, I do believe we, meaning aid workers, scholars, refugees, donors,
policy makers and anyone else involved in the humanitarian assistance process need to
very seriously start rethinking our assumptions about humanitarianism and I believe this
process of reimagining starts with our understanding of the people humanitarian
organizations are helping and the relationship between the two. Until we dismantle the
racist, sexist and classist perceptions about those in need of assistance, humanitarian aid
will continue to fail to alleviate suffering, I recognize that not all humanitarian operations
are failures, but I do believe there can be very different and more constructive ways of
helping people who have been affected by a disaster, an emergency or a crisis and this
process begins with understanding the relationships between the international community
and the aid recipients. At some point in the thesis I state that behind international
humanitarian assistance there echoes the sentiments of the failure of the state. I do not
believe this is necessarily a bad thing either, because I also think that in order to improve
humanitarian assistance we also need to reimagine what it means to be a citizen and the
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relationship of the citizen and the state. I think that this includes the perceptions of threats
and what it means for a population, or for a person to be a threat.
The Haitians who were internally displaced by the earthquake in 2010 are not
telling their own stories. Stories, like this thesis, are being told about them. Throughout
this thesis I have attempted to highlight how discourses about Haitians and
humanitarianism are both problematic and potentially damaging. How the world
describes and understands the internally displaced Haitian both reflects and constructs the
humanitarian programs and policies that affect the day-to-day lives of Haitians. The level
of control that humanitarian organizations exert, and the lack of voice and representation
of the majority of the displaced Haitians has created an environment in which security is
framed as necessary and is not questioned. By constructing Haitians as threats to be
secured against, humanitarian organizations, western media, and academics are
eliminating other alternatives to providing assistance to people who have lost friends,
family, their homes and their jobs. When humanitarianism operates as a mechanism of
security it presents a displaced person first as a security threat and last as a person in need
of help and assistance.
The aim of this thesis was not just to argue that all humanitarianism is
intervention, or that all Haitians are not security threats, but instead to explore how the
dominant narratives about humanitarianism and Haitians are a reflection of the unequal
power distribution of the international community and how those narratives construct to
portray Haitians and internally displaced populations in a particular way to help justify
political interventions, which in turn recreate and reconstruct the meanings and identities
of the population. Deconstructing dominant narratives about humanitarianism allows for
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a more nuanced exploration of what exactly humanitarianism is and how it functions as a
mechanism of power, governance and security.
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